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Abstract
Responses to Institutional Constraints
by
Ryan Michael Abman
Institutions, as mechanisms of social order, often constrain the behavior of individu-
als within a society. Political institutions constrain the behavior of politicians, financial
institutions constrain the behavior of businesses and payment processors and social in-
stitutions often constrain the behavior of individuals. These institutions often play an
important role in constraining activities that may be seen as illicit or unwanted and care-
ful analysis of these constraints can allow researchers to learn more about activities that
are often hidden or go unreported.
This dissertation explores the role of institutional constraints on unwanted behav-
ior by studying deforestation in Brazil and Malawi as well as underground activity in
fraudulent software sales. These cases share the commonality that they are influenced
by institutional constraints. Politicians in Brazil are constrained by reelection incentives,
perpetrators of fraudulent antivirus software are constrained by payment processors and
the cultural practice of ethnic favoritism in public good provision leads to particular
ethnic groups in Malawi receiving much more fertilizer subsidies than others.
The first chapter examines deforestation in Brazil. Local political authority (formal
or informal) over natural resources may create rents for politicians. The political decision
to use or allocate resources involves balancing private rents with reelection prospects. I
examine the case of deforestation in Brazil and a presidential decree granting the federal
government the authority to punish counties that failed to limit total deforestation within
their borders. This collective punishment aimed to generate pressure on local politicians
vii
to slow deforestation. Using binding term limits as a source of variation in reelection
eligibility, I find eligibility has no effect on deforestation prior to the decree. After the
decree, reelection eligible mayors reduced annual deforestation 10% more than mayors
ineligible for reelection. These findings are consistent with the equilibrium outcome of
a lobbying model. Policies such as sanctions, which target the electorate in order to
influence political behavior, may be less effective when politicians are not accountable to
voters.
The second chapter examines Fake antivirus (AV) programs which have been utilized
to defraud millions of computer users into paying as much as one hundred dollars for
a phony software license. As a result, fake AV software has evolved into one of the
most lucrative criminal operations on the Internet. In this chapter, we examine the
operations of three large-scale fake AV businesses, lasting from three months to more
than two years. More precisely, we present the results of our analysis on a trove of data
obtained from several backend servers that the cybercriminals used to drive their scam
operations. Our investigations reveal that these three fake AV businesses had earned a
combined revenue of more than $130 million dollars. A particular focus of our analysis
is on the financial and economic aspects of the scam, which involves legitimate credit
card networks as well as more dubious payment processors. In particular, we present an
economic model that demonstrates that fake AV companies are actively monitoring the
refunds (chargebacks) that customers demand from their credit card providers. When
the number of chargebacks increases in a short interval, the fake AV companies react to
customer complaints by granting more refunds. This lowers the rate of chargebacks and
ensures that a fake AV company can stay in business for a longer period of time. However,
this behavior also leads to unusual patterns in chargebacks, which can potentially be
leveraged by vigilant payment processors and credit card companies to identify and ban
fraudulent firms. This chapter is joint work with Brett Stone-Gross, Richard Kremmerer,
viii
Christopher Kruegel, Douglas Steigerwald, and Giovanni Vigna and was published as
Stone-Gross et al. (2013).
The final chapter returns to deforestation and studies it in the context of agriculture
in Malawi. The effect of development policies on the environment is often ambiguous ex
ante. Programs designed to improve agricultural productivity may increase deforestation
by raising the marginal productivity of agricultural land, thus increasing the demand
for land clearing. However, in a setting of subsistence farming on unproductive land,
increasing agricultural productivity may reduce the need to shift cultivation to maintain
the desired yields. This chapter examines the impact of agricultural subsidies on defor-
estation in Malawi by leveraging ethnic favoritism in government resource allocation. By
exploiting a change in the ethnicity of the Malawi president following the 2004 election,
we show that coethnic districts received more fertilizer subsidies and experienced signif-
icant declines in deforestation compared to districts with other predominant ethnicities.
This paper studies a case in which poverty alleviation programs have beneficial environ-
mental impacts demonstrating that, in certain contexts, input subsidies may provide a
‘win-win’ scenario. This chapter is joint work with Conor Carney.
ix
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Chapter 1
Reelection Incentives, Blacklisting
and Deforestation in Brazil
1.1 Introduction
The loss of tropical forests around the world has received increasing attention from
researchers, particularly in the context of global climate change. The carbon dioxide re-
leased from deforestation is estimated to have comprised nearly 20% of all global green-
house gas emissions from 2000-2007 (Pan et al., 2011). Deforestation has been most
prevalent in tropical forests which contain a disproportionate amount of the world’s bio-
diversity. These external consequences of tropical deforestation have motivated research
aimed to better understand the economic, social and political drivers of deforestation.
This paper studies the political drivers of deforestation, particularly the tradeoffs faced
by local politicians between private rents and reelection prospects.
Local political authority over forest resources may create rents for politicians. Po-
litical decisions over forest resource use must consider two factors, private rents and
reelection incentives. If these two incentives are aligned, for example, if deforestation
1
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is driven by politically popular local economic activity, reelection incentives may have
no influence over resource use. However, if increased resource use is at odds with the
demands of the electorate, politicians face a trade off in their resource decisions. Those
politicians without reelection incentives will choose to deforest more if this action entails
more private rents, whereas reelection eligible politicians may choose to deforest less in
hopes of winning reelection.
This paper examines a Brazilian presidential decree that allowed the federal gov-
ernment to single-out (blacklist) counties that failed to limit deforestation and impose
collective penalties on all landowners. Landowners in blacklisted counties lost eligibility
for subsidized credit and faced restrictions on selling beef as well as expensive land ti-
tling requirements. This decree created a collective demand to control deforestation even
though private demand for deforestation still remained. I argue that this decree exoge-
nously changed the demands of the electorate on local politicians in the Amazon with
regard to controlling deforestation and provides a unique opportunity to study how local
politicians balance private rent with reelection incentives in their control over natural
resources.
The introduction of this decree offers the opportunity to study the incentives faced by
local politicians who have de facto influence over deforestation yet risk being blacklisted if
they allow too much forest clearing to occur. To guide the empirical analysis, I present a
lobbying model whereby a local politician allocates permission to deforest among a large
number of landowners in exchange for political contributions. While each individual
landowner would privately like to deforest, landowners fear the politician may allow
too much deforestation and they would bear the costs of the collective punishment.
Landowners observe the total allocation of deforestation by the politician and decide
whether to vote for the incumbent or a challenger. The equilibrium of the model suggests
that the reelection incentive will lead the politician to choose less deforestation than he
2
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would without the possibility of reelection.
Using county-level satellite data on deforestation, I estimate a difference-in-difference
model on a panel of 639 counties in the Brazilian Amazon. I utilize binding term limits to
compare deforestation in counties with a mayor eligible for reelection to counties with a
mayor who is term-limited and thus ineligible for reelection. Prior to the introduction of
the policy, I find no difference between deforestation in counties with a mayor eligible for
reelection and counties with a term-limited mayor. However, after the introduction of the
policy, counties with a reelection eligible mayor reduce annual deforestation by 10% more
than counties with a term limited mayor. I show evidence that suggests voters punish
incumbent mayors for blacklisting by offering 10 - 11% less vote share and reelecting them
at a 16% lower rate in the following election than incumbent mayors in non-blacklisted
counties.
Understanding how political motivations influence use of natural resources is empir-
ically difficult for two primary reasons. First, the preferences of the voters over how a
resource is used may depend on the politician’s ability to extract rent from the resource.
Politicians may choose to tie social program spending to resource revenue so as to effec-
tively align the incentives of the electorate with the private incentives of the politician.
Second, the degree to which the politician is accountable to the voters may also depend
on the availability of resource rents. For example, rents in the form of political campaign
contributions may be used to discourage political competition allowing the incumbent
politician to be less accountable to the electorate and pursue their own agenda.1
This paper overcomes both of these obstacles. First, the policy that allowed the fed-
eral government to collectively punish an entire jurisdiction was passed by presidential
decree and, as such, required no support from local politicians. The policy exogenously
changed the demands of the electorate regarding how politicians controlled deforestation.
1See for example Mahdavi (2015); Brollo et al. (2013).
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Second, local mayors in Brazil may serve no more than two consecutive terms. This elec-
toral rule offers well-defined variation in political accountability as second term mayors
may not run for reelection. This paper provides an example in which, in the absence of
electoral accountability, local political authority over natural resources leads to patterns
of resource use that are at odds with the demands of the electorate.
This paper contributes to a growing literature on the political economy of defor-
estation as well as the role of electoral accountability and political behavior in natural
resource use. The early literature on the political economy of deforestation documents
the importance of a government’s ability and willingness to enforce property rights in
explaining country-level deforestation (Deacon, 1994; Bohn and Deacon, 2000). Follow-
up work moved from cross country analysis to within country variation in governance to
study deforestation(Ferreira and Vincent, 2010; Wendland et al., 2014). Other papers
have been more explicit in modeling the interaction between landowners and politicians.
Based on Grossman and Helpman (1994), these papers argue that a significant amount of
deforestation can be explained through the channel of corruption, whereby local economic
interests lobby or bribe the government to allow more forest clearing activity (Barbier
et al., 2005) or to receive agricultural subsidies (Bulte et al., 2007) and put more land
into extensive agriculture. This paper contributes to this work by explicitly examining
the role of electoral accountability as well as utilizing within-country data to mitigate
concerns that arise from unobserved heterogeneity in national institutions with respect
to forest management.
Recent work has explicitly examined local political incentives and deforestation within
a given country. Burgess et al. (2012) examine the effect of a proliferation of local juris-
dictional units on deforestation in Indonesia finding that this led to a significant increase
in deforestation. Cisneros et al. (2013) examine corruption among local politicians and
deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon. They find that mayors caught stealing public
4
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funds and engaging in other corrupt behavior allow more deforestation. Morjaria (2014)
finds the transition to democracy in Kenya led to significantly higher deforestation in
politically contested districts as the president was able to allocate permits in exchange
for votes. While Burgess et al. (2012) and Cisneros et al. (2013) study the private rents
aspect of political decisions over deforestation and Morjaria (2014) studies the reelec-
tion aspect of political decisions over deforestation, this paper examines both aspects,
particularly the trade off between the two incentives.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the blacklisting policy as well as
local politics and political influence over forest resources in Brazil. Section 3 develops a
political agency model of deforestation under the threat of blacklisting. Section 4 presents
the data and empirical methodology and Section 5 discusses the empirical findings. The
paper concludes with some final remarks.
1.2 Regulation, deforestation and local politics in
Brazil
Brazil has overseen an unprecedented decline in deforestation over the past decade.
From its peak of approximately 28 thousand square kilometers deforested in 2004, annual
deforestation fell to a mere 4,571 square kilometers in 2012.(INPE, 2013) This dramatic
decline has been attributed to a combination of falling commodity prices and new policing
strategies by the federal government. (Assunc¸a˜o et al., 2012; Hargrave and Kis-Katos,
2013; Nepstad et al., 2014) Despite strict laws governing deforestation on private land,
the enforcement of such laws was largely ineffective until 2004. The federal environ-
mental agency adopted the Action Plan for the Prevention and Control of Deforestation
in the Legal Amazon (PPCDAm), a command and control policy aimed at curbing de-
5
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forestation. This plan dramatically increased the area of forest resources set aside for
protection and introduced real time satellite monitoring of deforestation (which began in
2004) to detect illegal deforestation activity. The improved monitoring led lead to more
raids, arrests, confiscation of cattle and farm equipment as well as fines. Upon detect-
ing deforestation via satellite, the Federal enforcement agency in charge of deforestation
monitoring (IBAMA) would send out local inspectors to the site. This greatly increased
the capacity for enforcement, led to a dramatic increase in fines for deforestation. De-
spite an extremely low fine payment rate, research has found that these inspections were
important in decreasing the rate of deforestation. (Assunc¸a˜o et al., 2012, 2013; Hargrave
and Kis-Katos, 2013)2
While the real-time satellite monitoring system greatly improved the federal gov-
ernment’s ability to target monitoring efforts, enforcement required catching illegal de-
foresters in the act of clearing land or transporting timber. Agents from the federal
government were often met with local protests, threatened by armed grileiros or arrived
to find timber mills already abandoned as locals had received advanced notice of their
inspection. The federal government wanted a mechanism to control deforestation that
did not entirely rely on the ability of inspectors to find actors engaging in deforestation.
1.2.1 The Blacklisting Policy
In 2008 the command and control legislation was strengthened by Presidential decree
6,321 which created the legal basis for blacklisting counties with intense deforestation
activity. There are three principle criteria for singling out particular municipalities; total
deforested area, total deforested area over the past three years, and an increase in the
deforestation rate in at least three of the past five years. A blacklisted county is subject to
2Notable economics literature on deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon has examined the economic
causes of deforestation (Pfaff, 1999; Pfaff et al., 2007) as well as the effects of conservation policies such
as protected area establishment (Barber et al., 2012; Pfaff et al., 2013; Nolte et al., 2013).
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more stringent monitoring and environmental law enforcement as well as potential land
title revisions by the National Institute for Colonization and Agrarian Reform (INCRA).
Furthermore, to qualify for subsidized credit, landowners in blacklisted counties must
prove that their land has been registered through a georeferenced land registry and that
they have no outstanding fines from IBAMA. This increases the cost for all landowners
within the municipality of titling land and complying with federal laws. Furthermore,
some international soy and beef suppliers will not purchase from municipalities under
priority status thus closing market options for goods produced within the municipality.
In 2009, federal prosecutors began to take legal action against beef suppliers who had
purchased cattle raised in blacklisted counties.
An article in the Economist Magazine on September 14, 2013 reporting on one black-
listed municipality, Paragominas, states,
”Being blacklisted did not just bring public humiliation to the citizens of
Paragominas, it also hit their wallets. Businesses in municipalities on the list
were not eligible for cheap credit from state owned banks. ... The federal
public prosecutor in Para, Daniel Avelino, followed the supply chain back
from the supermarkets through the beef companies to the ranchers to find out
which animals had been produced on illegally deforested land, and threatened
the super markets with prosecution.”
Such measures were designed to make local politicians accountable for high rates
of deforestation and previous research has argued that blacklisting can be politically
costly.(Assunc¸a˜o et al., 2013; Hargrave and Kis-Katos, 2013) Blacklisting imposed costs
on everyone in the county, not just those engaging in deforestation. By threatening
a public bad for excessive deforestation, the federal government wanted to force local
mayors to solve the collective action problem of limiting deforestation.
7
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Upon passing the policy, 36 municipalities were immediately blacklisted in 2008.
Seven were added in March of 2009 and seven more were added in March of 2010. Figure
1.1 provides a map of these counties. Empirical results reported later indicate that defor-
estation in blacklisted municipalities dropped by 25% under blacklisted status.3 Removal
from the blacklist required that the county formally register 80% of its territory (with
the exception of approved protected areas and indigenous lands) with the INCRA as well
as maintain annual deforestation below a limit set by the Ministry of the Environment.
As of 2013, only two counties had left the blacklist.
For the purposes of this study, there are two important characteristics of blacklist-
ing which deserve attention. First, as discussed above, blacklisting shifts the cost of
deforestation from the individual agent engaging in deforestation (landowner, sawmill
operator, rancher, etc.) to the entire county. Second, the blacklisting policy was passed
by presidential decree, which did not require the consent or votes of local politicians. For
this reason, the blacklisting decree can be seen as exogenous from the perspective of vot-
ers and local politicians. I argue that the introduction of the policy exogenously changed
the demands of the voters on local politicians with respect to controlling deforestation.
Voters who would have previously been indifferent to the amount of deforestation in their
county risk bearing costs associated with the collective punishment from blacklisting if
local deforestation is not controlled.
1.2.2 Mayoral Control of Forest Resources
While formal authority over land use largely lies with the Federal government, local
politicians exert substantial influence over deforestation. In 2008, the Brazilian Environ-
mental minister, Carlos Minc, argued the observed increase in deforestation was linked
to local elections, claiming that mayors were ignoring illegal logging activity in order to
3See section 5 for details
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Figure 1.1: Blacklisted counties
win votes (Balakrishnan, 2008). Cisneros et al. (2013) explicitly examine local corruption
and deforestation among mayors in the Amazon from 2002-2009. Using data from ran-
domized corruption audits focusing on management of public funds, the authors find that
average corruption is correlated with higher deforestation. Furthermore, they find mayors
increase deforestation in response to an audit finding corrupt behavior. They attribute
this finding to mayors shifting corrupt behavior from public funds toward unmonitored
corrupt behavior, enabling illegal deforestation.
9
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Mayors have informal channels by which to influence deforestation. Some mayors
have engaged in fraud to legalize illegal timber by falsifying the necessary paperwork.4
Landowners are only allowed to extract 15 cubic meters of timber per hectare in a given
year and all timber extraction from protected areas is illegal. Falsified documents may
hide the source of illegally extracted timber.
Mayors may work with local squatters or large landowners to coordinate squatter
settlements in protected areas or on privately held land. Landowners with squatters on
their land are entitled to compensation from the federal government which is often above
the market price for land. Mayors may also tolerate or even facilitate the illicit selling of
untitled land which effectively removes forest cover restrictions faced by the titled land.
Mayors have also been involved in diverting equipment intended for public use and small
family farms to large private properties, reducing the cost to the landowner of clearing
their land.5 Mayors have also fought to block the establishment of protected areas in
their jurisdictions. While the creation of protected areas is often done at the Federal or
State level, they require consultation of local mayors before their establishment.
1.2.3 Local Politics in Brazil
Local mayors play an important role the provision of public services such as health
and education and in settling local disputes. Mayors are elected by popular vote in each
county and serve terms of four years. Local elections are held on separate four-year cycles
from state and federal elections and take place in October of the election year with the
winner taking office in January of the following year. Since 1997, mayors are allowed to
4For example, the mayor of Nova Mamore was accused by the Public Ministry of the State of Rondonia
of falsifying documentation pertaining to timber that had been extracted illegally between 2007 and 2008
to benefit a timber company with which he had connections.(Rondoniagora, 2014)
5An example of one such case occurred in the county of Davinopolis, whereby the mayor was able to
procure machinery dedicated to small, family farms through the PRONAF program and use it to clear
land for a large landowner who would not have qualified for the assistance otherwise.
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serve at most two consecutive terms and may only run for office again after a one-term
hiatus.6
Few candidates eligible for a second term actually serve one. Table 1.1 summarizes
election results for the 760 counties in the legal Amazon. 70% of incumbents ran for a
second term yet less than 40% of eligible candidates were reelected from 2000 to 2012.7
The absence of a clear incumbency advantage implies that incumbent politicians have
the incentive to work hard and cater to the interests of the voters in their first term in
order to win reelection. This reelection incentive has been shown to motivate reelection
eligible politicians to steal fewer resources (27% less) than term limited mayors (Ferraz
and Finan, 2011) and to allocate conditional cash transfers more effectively than term
limited mayors (De Janvry et al., 2012). Reelection eligible mayors who do not perform
well are punished by voters (Ferraz and Finan, 2008; De Janvry et al., 2012).
The constitution of Brazil makes voting mandatory for all citizens ages 18 to 65. The
introduction of electronic voting in Brazil created a large de facto enfranchisement of
less educated voters and allowed for near-perfect records of voting to be measured even
in remote locations (Fujiwara, 2010). Municipal elections occur every four years and
do so on a separate cycle from state and federal elections. The chief executives of the
three levels of government (federal, state, municipal) are chosen by majority vote with
municipalities under 200,000 in population electing the candidate with a plurality and
those with greater populations carrying out a run-off election to ensure a majority vote.
Elections are held in October and the winning candidate takes office at the beginning of
January of the following year.
6Prior to 1997, mayors could not serve a second consecutive term.
7This accords with Ferraz and Finan (2011) who study all Brazilian counties.
11
Reelection Incentives, Blacklisting and Deforestation in Brazil Chapter 1
1.3 A Political Agency Model of Brazilian Deforesta-
tion
To understand the role of reelection incentives and blacklisting in the Brazilian Ama-
zon, I consider a context in which a county is populated by a large number of landown-
ers who produce an identical agricultural good with deforested land. An individual
landowner is only able to clear additional land with permission from the mayor. The
mayor, in turn, receives campaign contributions or bribes from the landowners and makes
allocation decisions accordingly. A collective penalty is imposed on all landowners if the
aggregate amount of deforestation exceeds a known threshold. This feature captures the
blacklisting policy. Landowners (who are also voters) rely on the mayor to limit the total
amount of deforestation allocated in order to avoid the collective punishment. Landown-
ers are able to constrain the behavior of the mayor in the first term via the reelection
mechanism, but are unable to do so in the mayor’s final term.
I model this using a two-period political agency model based on Besley (2006) where
payoffs are determined by a menu auction game based on Grossman and Helpman (1994).
I assume that a mayor can be one of two types - corrupt or benevolent - based on whether
the mayor’s preferences include the welfare of the landowners. I assume the mayor type
is private information held by the mayor. In each period, landowners simultaneously and
competitively submit a contribution schedule to the mayor, which maps any given amount
of permissible deforestation into a contribution. Upon receiving the schedules, the mayor
allocates permission to deforest among landowners and collects the appropriate payments.
If the total amount of deforestation exceeds the pre-determined blacklisting threshold,
all landowners incur a penalty which is independent of the amount of deforestation the
individual landowner was allocated in that period. The preferences of a benevolent mayor
include the welfare of the landowners. Consequently, a benevolent mayor will limit the
12
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amount of deforestation so as to avoid the collective punishment. A corrupt mayor,
however, prefers to allow more deforestation in order to collect more contributions and
has no direct preferences regarding the punishment of the landowners.
After the first period, landowners vote to decide whether to reelect the incumbent
mayor or elect a challenger whose type is unknown. The reelection decision allows voters
to cast out a mayor who allocates too much land for clearing in the first period, knowing
that the mayor’s type must be corrupt and that the same mayor will continue to allocate
too much land in the second period, inducing another collective punishment. The reelec-
tion decision benefits landowners in two ways; it disciplines the actions of corrupt mayors
in the first period, and allows voters to improve the probability of having a benevolent
mayor in office for the second period.
In what follows, I describe the players of the game, provide the timing of the game
and describe the equilibrium.
1.3.1 Landowners
Consider a county with N identical landowners who use their land to produce an
identical agricultural product. They produce this product using newly cleared land in
that period, hi,t and sell the good at market price, Pt which they all take as given. The
production function is increasing and concave in its argument and each landowner faces
a shock to total factor productivity in each period, αi,t which is drawn independently
and identically from a stationary distribution. The draw of total factor productivity is
revealed to the landowner at the beginning of each period.
In this model, it is assumed that landowners may only clear land if they receive
permission from the mayor. This assumption captures the fact that, while landowners
themselves can clear land without explicit permission, mayoral support can make the
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land clearing cheaper or, in the case of falsified documents, make illegal deforestation
appear legal. The assumption that land clearing may only take place with the support of
the government is also made in previous work such as Barbier et al. (2005) and Burgess
et al. (2012).
In order to gain this support, each landowner submits a contribution schedule to
the mayor which maps any given level of permitted deforestation into a lump-sum con-
tribution. These payments are contingent upon the landowner receiving permission to
deforest a particular amount of land. This paper focuses on truthful bidding strategies
for reasons discussed below. Such schedules allow the mayor to observe the willingness
to pay for deforestation for all landowners for all possible quantities of deforestation in a
particular period. The willingness to pay for deforestation varies across landowners and
across periods by the realization of αi,t, an independent and identically drawn total fac-
tor productivity shock. While all landowners are ex ante identical, after the realization
of the shock, landowners with high draws will be willing to pay more for deforestation
than those with low draws. The payment schedule for landowner i in period t is de-
noted si,t(hi,t). The contribution schedule is assumed to be non-negative for all values of
hi,t.
8 The other potential cost faced by the landowner is the private cost incurred from
blacklisting. Blacklisting occurs if the total sum of deforestation in the county exceeds a
particular threshold H and costs each landowner the same amount, ∆.
The utility function of landowner i is linear in profits and is as follows:
Ulandowneri,t = Ptαi,tq(hi,t)− si,t(hi,t)−∆1{
N∑
j=1
hj,t > H} (1.1)
where 1{∑Nj=1 hj,t > H} is an indicator function equal to 1 if the sum of allocated
deforestation exceeds the threshold, and zero otherwise. Note the collective penalty from
8This condition simply states that landowners cannot charge the mayor for permission to deforest,
which accords with intuition.
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blacklisting affects all landowners identically, regardless of their level of deforestation in
that period.
Landowners in the model have choices over two dimensions. First, in each period,
after the productivity parameter is revealed, they submit contribution schedules to the
mayor in order to compete for permission to deforest. Second, at the end of the first
period, landowners have the choice to vote in favor of the incumbent mayor or vote for
a challenger. The equilibrium strategies for both choices are discussed below.
1.3.2 Mayors
In this model, I assume there are two types of mayors, corrupt and benevolent. The
type is denoted by θ ∈ {0, 1} with a θ = 0 corresponding to the corrupt mayor and
θ = 1 corresponding to the benevolent mayor. The mayor type is privately revealed to
the mayor, but the distribution of types is common knowledge, with Pr(θ = 1) = pi.
The forgone utility from serving as mayor is normalized to zero, so utility gained from
actions in office are net of potential outside income or other sources of utility. Formally
the utility function of the mayor in period t is as follows:
Umayort = θ
N∑
i=1
ui,t(hi,t) +
N∑
i=1
si,t(hi,t) (1.2)
S.T.
N∑
i=1
hi,t ≤ HMAX
The job of the mayor is allocate deforestation among the landowners. This decision
is two-fold, first the mayor must choose how much total deforestation to allow, and
then the mayor must choose how to allocate the total amount of deforestation among the
landowners within the county. In each period, mayors observe the submitted contribution
schedules of the landowners and decide how much to allocate to each landowner. The
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mayor is constrained to the total amount of deforestation he may allocate in any given
period to HMAX .9
1.3.3 Equilibrium of Menu Auction Game
In each period, landowners bid for permission to clear land while the mayor chooses
the total amount of land to allocate and, conditional on that level of total land, how
to allocate land among the landowners. The menu auction in this model is a simple
application of Bernheim and Whinston (1986) and I draw from their results to establish
the equilibrium of the game. For this section, I drop the time subscript, t, and focus
simply on the strategies in a given period.
Let soi (hi) ∈ Si(hi) denote the contribution schedule submitted by the landowner and
ho denote the 1×N vector of allocations made by the mayor. For any given level of H
chosen by the mayor, ({soi}i∈N ,ho) is a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium if and only if:
1. soi (hi) is feasible for all i ∈ N
2. ho maximizes θ
∑N
i=1 ui(hi) +
∑N
i=1 s
o
i (hi) such that
∑N
i=1 hi ≤ H
3. ho maximizes ui(hi) + θ
∑N
i=1 ui(hi) +
∑N
i=1 s
o
i (hi) for every i ∈ N such that∑N
i=1 hi ≤ H.
While these conditions have been extensively discussed in the political economy lit-
erature, I briefly describe their intuition.10 Condition (1) states that all contribution
offers must be feasible. This condition proves trivial with the nonnegative assumption
imposed above as well as the fact that offering to pay more than the marginal benefit
9This constraint restricts the mayor’s influence over deforestation to be finite. From the standpoint
of the model, what is needed is that the resource the mayor allocates is, in some way, scarce. The main
findings of the model hold if, rather than imposing a limit on the total amount of allocation, the mayor
faces a marginal cost of allocating deforestation.
10See Bernheim and Whinston (1986) as well as Grossman and Helpman (1994).
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for deforestation is not optimal for the landowner. Condition (2) states that the alloca-
tion of deforestation permission must maximize the utility of the mayor. Condition (3)
states that the contribution schedule and allocation of deforestation must maximize the
joint utility of the the mayor and any landowner. This condition must hold for a Nash
equilibrium to exist. If it did not hold, landowners could alter their strategy and capture
more surplus.
Among the ways landowners could choose si(hi), I focus on truthful contribution
schedules, whereby the landowner offers his full net-willingness-to-pay for any given level
of deforestation. Because permission to deforest is rivalrous, each landowner is competing
against the offers of other landowners for permission to clear land. Consider a simple case
of two landowners/bidders (A,B) for one unit of deforestation. If αA > αB, landowner A
will offer the politician PαB[q(1)−q(0)]+, the full-willingness-to-pay of landownerB plus
some arbitrarily small amount, , to ensure the politician strictly prefers to offer the unit
of deforestation to A. B will offer his full-willingness-to-pay for that unit of deforestation,
PαB[q(1) − q(0)], and will be indifferent between winning the auction and losing. Now
consider a third landowner/bidder (C) with αA > αC > αB. In this very same auction
for one unit of deforestation, B and C offer their full-willingness-to-pay. While A will still
win, he must offer a greater amount to the mayor, PαC [q(1)− q(0)] + . As the number
of landowners becomes large, the difference between αA and MAX{αB, αC , . . . , αN} will
become arbitrarily small and the optimal bid for A will approach his full-willingness-
to-pay for deforestation.11 Truthful bidding will ensure that deforestation is allocated
efficiently among landowners (landowners who value deforestation the most are the ones
who receive permission to do so) but truthful bidding will also allow the mayor to capture
11Truthful bidding is used in Grossman and Helpman (1994),Barbier et al. (2005),and Bulte et al.
(2007) and others. Theorems (1)-(3) of Bernheim and Whinston (1986) prove that, even in menu auctions
with small numbers of bidders, truthful bidding strategies 1) always exist in a bidder’s best-response
correspondence, 2) lead to an efficient allocation choice, and 3) are coalition-proof in the presence of
nonbinding communication among bidders.
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the full surplus from the auction.12
The truthful bidding strategy by the landowner, denoted s∗i (hi), implies that in a
given period, landowner i will offer the following contribution schedule for any level of
deforestation permitted by the mayor.
s∗i (hi) = Pαi[q(hi)− q(0)] (1.3)
The truthful bidding strategy implies that the landowner does not account for the
likelihood of blacklisting in the contribution schedule. The landowner effectively takes
the mayor’s choice of H as given (although it is not observed) for the menu auction and
competes for permission to deforest in exactly the same way if H > H or H < H. This
stems from the fact that the penalty incurred by the landowner is additively separable
from the amount of private deforestation undertaken and from the fact that the individual
landowner cannot, unilaterally, alter the total amount of deforestation chosen by the
politician by reducing his contribution schedule.
Upon receiving the contribution schedules, the mayor must then decide how much
land to allocate and to whom this permission should be granted. I begin by addressing
the question of how a mayor allocates the permission to clear land among the landowners
and then address the decision on the total amount of land to clear. By Theorem 2
of Bernheim and Whinston (1986), the Truthful Nash Equilibrium will yield an efficient
action choice regardless of the type of mayor. However, the difference in preferences of the
two mayor types may potentially lead to different, efficient allocations. This motivates
the following proposition.
Proposition 1: Given a set of truthful contribution schedules ({s∗i }Ni=1) and a fixed
12This case is analogous to the example of all voters as special interest groups investigated by Gross-
man and Helpman (1994). “When all voters are active in the process of being influence, the rivalry
among competing interests is most intense, and the government captures all of the surplus from political
relationships” (page 846).
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level of total deforestation H, the optimal allocation of deforestation permission, h∗,
does not depend on mayor type, θ. For proof, see appendix A.0.1. The intuition for the
proposition is simple. Regardless of the type of mayor, mayors prefer to allocate some
total amount of deforestation to the landowners who value it the most because, under
truthful bidding, this will maximize the total contributions received.
Proposition 1 reduces of the mayor’s choice to the total level of deforestation per-
mitted. The corrupt mayor only has preferences for maximizing contributions with no
regard to the costs of the blacklisting on the landowners in the county. Let S∗(H) be
the maximized total contributions from the efficient allocation of H total deforestation.
Truthful bidding implies that landowners bid their full willingness to pay for deforestation
regardless of the level of H chosen by the mayor. Therefore, S∗(H) is strictly increasing
in H and the corrupt mayor prefers the highest level of H possible.
The preferences of the benevolent mayor lead to a different outcome. While increas-
ing H beyond H increases contributions, it also causes the electorate to incur the collec-
tive punishment which enters into the preferences of the benevolent mayor. As long as
S∗(HMAX)−S∗(H) < N∆, the benevolent mayor will choose to limit total deforestation
to H. It is this difference that provides the basis for the signaling game.
1.3.4 Political Agency and Electoral Accountability Equilib-
rium
The menu auction provides the per-period payoffs of the game, but the notion of
political agency component lies in the signaling model discussed here. The timing of the
game is as follows:
1. Nature reveals to the incumbent mayor his type, θ.
2. Landowners observe first period total factor productivity realizations (αi,1) and
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submit their contribution schedules (si,1(hi,1)) accordingly.
3. Mayors observe the contribution schedules and choose the total amount of defor-
estation permission to allocate, H1.
13 Landowners pay mayors and clear land. First
period payoffs are realized.
4. Landowners decide whether to vote for the incumbent mayor or for a challenger
whose type is drawn at random from the distribution of types. The mayor, an
incumbent or challenger, is elected.
5. Landowners observe second period total factor productivity realizations (αi,2) and
submit their contribution schedules (si,2(hi,2)) accordingly.
6. Mayors observe the contribution schedules and allocate permission to clear land
(H2). Landowners pay mayors and clear land. Second period payoffs are realized
and the game ends.
The equilibrium concept for this game is a perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium, whereby
the mayor behaves optimally in each stage of the game given the reelection rule of the
voters and the voters update their beliefs regarding the mayor’s type using Bayes’ rule
upon observing first-period actions. The game is solved by backwards induction. The
second period actions by the mayor depend only on type. Benevolent mayors will choose
H2 = H to avoid blacklisting so long as S
∗(HMAX)− S∗(H) < N∆. Corrupt politicians
will choose H2 = H
MAX because the maximized sum of contributions is strictly increasing
in H.
Under the truthful bidding strategy, the voters all prefer to have a benevolent mayor
in office for period 2 as the collective punishment would make all landowners worse off.
13By Proposition 1, the amount allocated to the individual landowners will simply be the contribution
maximizing allocation for the chosen total allocated land, H1.
20
Reelection Incentives, Blacklisting and Deforestation in Brazil Chapter 1
The beliefs about the mayor’s type will be informed from the payoffs received in period
one. A benevolent mayor sets H1 = H. The corrupt mayor faces a trade-off. He can set
H1 = H
MAX and collect S∗1(H
MAX) in contributions, but, in doing so he reveals his type
as corrupt to the voters and will be voted out of office, receiving zero payoffs in period 2.
The corrupt mayor may also choose H1 = H, forgo the additional S
∗
1(H
MAX) − S∗1(H)
in contributions, but improve his chances of being reelected and collecting S∗2(H
MAX)
in contributions in period 2. Allow λ to be the probability a corrupt mayor will choose
H1 = H.
Upon facing no penalty in the first period, the landowners beliefs about the probability
the incumbent mayor is benevolent are:
Pr(θ = 1|No penalty) = pi
pi + (1− pi)λ ≥ pi (1.4)
Equation (1.4) implies that, having incurred no penalty in period one, the probability
the mayor in office is benevolent is greater than the probability a mayor selected at
random will be benevolent. Voters would thus prefer to reelect the incumbent rather
than electing a challenger to serve as mayor in period 2. If voters incur a penalty in
period 1, they know that the incumbent mayor is corrupt (Pr(θ = 1|∆) = 0 ≤ pi) and
would prefer to elect the challenger. Thus, the optimal strategy of the voters is to vote
for the incumbent when he sets H1 = H and to vote for a challenger when the incumbent
sets H1 > H.
Given the reelection rule set forth by the voters, the deforestation choice of the
corrupt mayor for H1 is now clear. If the set of contribution schedules offered to a
corrupt first-term mayor is sufficiently high, the mayor will set H1 = H and forgo the
discounted expected second-period contributions, βE[S∗2(H
MAX)], where β is the discount
rate. However, if the first period returns to exceeding the threshold are smaller than
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the discounted expected second period contributions, the corrupt mayor will choose to
limit first period deforestation to win reelection. Recall that λ is probability a corrupt
politician limits deforestation to the mandated threshold. It can formally be expressed
as
λ = Pr
(
S∗1(H
MAX)− S∗1(H) < βE
[
S∗2(H
MAX)
])
. (1.5)
While the mayor is able to capture the surplus in the menu auction game, the electoral
accountability mechanism benefits the voters in two ways. First, it incentivizes a corrupt
mayor to take the action preferred by the voters with probability λ in the first period.
This is known as the disciplining effect of electoral accountability. Second, it increases
the probability that voters have a benevolent politician in office for period 2 by allowing
them to remove corrupt politicians with probability (1 − λ). This is referred to as the
selection effect.
The implications of the equilibrium of the model on deforestation by period depend
on the parameters of the model. The expected values of total deforestation in each period
are as follows.
E[H1] = H(pi + (1− pi)λ) +HMAX(1− λ)(1− pi) (1.6)
E[H2] = H(pi + (1− λ)(1− pi)pi) +HMAX((1− pi)λ+ (1− λ)(1− pi)2) (1.7)
In the first period, both benevolent mayors as well as disciplined corrupt mayors will
limit deforestation to the threshold level. Only undisciplined corrupt mayors will allow
deforestation to exceed the threshold amount. In the second period, benevolent mayors
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(reelected incumbents or benevolent challengers replacing undisciplined corrupt mayors
from the first period) limit deforestation to the threshold. All corrupt mayors (those that
hid their type to get reelected and corrupt challengers replacing undisciplined corrupt
mayors from the first period) will allow as much deforestation as possible. Under the
blacklisting regime, expected deforestation in the first period will be lower than expected
deforestation in the second period if a sufficiently large share of corrupt politicians are
disciplined by the reelection incentive, or precisely pi < λ
1−λ .
1.3.5 Preblacklist Equilibrium
In order to contrast the equilibrium described above with that of the equilibrium prior
to the blacklisting regime, allow ∆ to equal zero. This removes the collective punishment
and changes the incentives for voters and politicians alike. Voters now prefer the mayor
to set H1 = H2 = H
MAX and both types of mayors do exactly that. Voters gain no
information from first period actions, but are indifferent between the two types of mayors
for the second period, so the decision of whether or not to reelect becomes orthogonal
to mayor type. In contrast to the model with blacklisting there is no expected difference
in deforestation between period one and period two. By allowing period one and period
two to be analogous to the first term and the second term (term limit) of a mayor, the
differences in the two variants of the model generate hypotheses to test in the data.
1.3.6 Overlapping regimes in 2009-2012
The application of the model to this particular empirical context requires one caveat.
Because deforestation is only observed until 2012, only one electoral cycle is observed
under the blacklisting regime. The blacklisting policy was enacted in an election year
which implies the deforestation patterns observed may not reflect the full equilibrium of
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the model. The cohort eligible for reelection in 2008 served a first term under the pre
blacklist regime, which implies there was no selection effect from electoral accountability.
Without selection, the distribution of mayor types in the second period is identical to
that of the first period. This implies that the expected deforestation for second term
mayors in this regime is equal to
E[H2] = H(pi) +H
MAX(1− pi). (1.8)
However, the cohort of first term mayors face the reelection incentives under the
blacklisting regime, implying the expected level of total deforestation among these first
term mayors is equal to that in (1.6). Because no selection occurs until the election in
2012, the difference in deforestation will be entirely driven by the disciplining effect. This
implies that deforestation will necessarily be greater among the second-term cohort than
the cohort eligible for reelection for 2009 to 2012 because some of the corrupt first term
mayors will try to mask their type by deforesting less.14
1.4 Empirical Analysis
The model discussed above generates two empirically-testable hypotheses with re-
gards to deforestation and one with regard to reelection. First, deforestation prior to
2008 should be the same in counties with reelection-eligible mayors as in counties with
term-limited mayors. Second, after 2008, deforestation in counties with term-limited
mayors should be higher than deforestation in counties with reelection eligible mayors.
Using variation in binding term-limits, I employ a difference in differences strategy to
test these two hypotheses. Lastly, incumbent mayors in blacklisted counties should be
14This can be seen by a simple comparison of equations (1.6) and (1.8).
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voted out of office. To test this hypothesis, I estimate an incumbent mayor’s vote share
in 2012 as well as whether the mayor is reelected in 2012 as a function of the blacklist
status of his/her county.
The data for this paper are comprised of set of annual observations from 2002 to 2012
on 760 Brazilian Municipalities in the legal amazon (see Figure 1). Data for this paper are
publicly available and come from three different Brazilian agencies. The primary mea-
sure of deforestation comes from the PRODES project of the Brazilian Space Research
Agency (INPE, 2013), which provides annual estimates of deforestation by county. These
estimates are produced from analyzing images of forest cover from Landsat images. The
fine scale of the data comes at the cost of infrequent observations. Each year, the best,
cloud-free images are chosen from July to September (the time window with the least
amount of cloud cover in the amazon rainforest) and are overlaid with a map of existing,
intact forest cover. This map is then updated by areas where forest loss was detected,
providing the new map of existing forest cover for comparison the following year. Hansen
et al. (2008) identify potential short comings in PRODES deforestation estimates using
MODIS satellite data. Once an area is deforested, it is permanently removed from the
study area in PRODES which makes the data incapable of examining changes in sec-
ondary forest cover.15 Second, the cerrado and cerradao regions of the legal amazon
also experience forest loss, but are not studied by PRODES. While the policies studied
in this paper apply to the amazon regions explicitly, PRODES data cannot be used to
test whether the effects exist outside of their intended area. (Alternative measures of
deforestation are considered for this purpose in section 6). The focus on amazon forest
of PRODES data limits the initial sample to 639 counties.
Reelection eligibility, incumbent status and vote share are determined by matching
15Secondary forest cover is tree growth in once deforested area. For example, if pasture land is
abandoned, and trees grow back inside the cleared area, this would be secondary forest cover. Any new
clearing of this forest would not be identified by PRODES.
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the names of previous winners to current candidates in each of the elections from 1996
(when all incumbent mayors were eligible for reelection) through 2012 using data from
from the Brazilian Supreme Electoral Court (TSE). Table 1.1 provides the summary
statistics for incumbent politicians and reelection to a second term and Figure 1.2 maps
the counties in which incumbents win and where incumbents lose in the 2000, 2004, 2008
and 2012 elections.
Table 1.1: Election Summary
Year 2000 2004 2008 2012
Incumbents Running 505 328 423 362
Incumbent Victories 276 181 255 164
Total Elections 760 760 760 760
I include controls for economic factors that have been shown to drive deforestation.
Controls for each municipality come from the Municipal Agricultural Survey by the
Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE) and include survey data on cattle,
harvested acres dedicated to soybeans, total value of production from soybeans, official
timber production quantity and value. From this data, I calculate nominal farm-gate
prices for soybeans at the municipality level (following Hargrave and Kis-Katos (2013). I
use commodity price data from the World Bank to capture time variation in beef prices.
As this is the international price, this measure does not vary across municipalities, only
across time. All prices are converted to 1998 Brazilian Reals. I interact both the price
data with the corresponding lagged quantity data to allow changes in beef prices, for
example, to have differential impacts on areas with more cattle from those with no
cattle. Finally, to control for protected areas, I use data form the World Database of
Protected Areas. I calculate the fraction of land inside any form of protected area for
each municipality in each year. Table 1.2 summarizes the data used in this paper.
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Figure 1.2: Elections in Amazon counties
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1.4.1 Deforestation and reelection eligibility
I utilize two measures of deforestation for the empirical analysis. First, I use the
natural log of forest loss as measured in square kilometers, which allows for intuitive
interpretation of coefficient estimates. Second, for ease of cross county comparison, I
construct a standardized measure of the incremental deforestation in a given county, i,
in a given year, t. The normalized measure of deforestation, N Defori,t is created as
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Table 1.2: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Cattle 103495.8 149900.1 0 2143760
Cattle per km2 34.42569 38.04579 0 246.1589
Planted Soy Area (acres) 8628.706 41781.47 0 608000
Planted Soy Area (%) 10.3572 22.78965 0 96.78
Harvested Soy Area (acres) 8621.128 41738.18 0 608000
Harvested Soy Area (%) 10.39455 22.86373 0 96.78
Soy Price 0.0588603 0.1116716 0 0.7302875
Protected Area (%) 18.20657 28.44221 0 100
Share of Family Farming - Area 0.4482019 0.2577647 0.0018942 1
Share of Family Farming - Units 0.8589439 0.1338808 0.0337079 1
Share of Family Farming - Value 0.5605426 0.3092991 0.0018625 1
Number of clusters 639
Obs per cluster 11
follows:16
N Defori,t =
Defori,t −Defori
SD(Defori)
(1.9)
In the above equation, Defori,t corresponds to the amount of deforested area in
that county and year as measured in square kilometers. Defori is the average annual
deforested area in that county over the sample period and SD(Defori) is the standard
deviation of deforested area over the sample period.
The model suggests that the term limit status of the mayor should have no impact on
deforestation prior to 2008, but term limited mayors will, on average, deforest more than
their reelection eligible counterparts after 2008. Firgure 1.3 plots the average deforesta-
tion for all counties with mayors running for reelection in 2004. After 2004, mayors who
win reelection are term limited and those who lose and are replaced by a mayor eligible
for reelection in 2008. From 2001 to 2008, there is no systematic difference between the
two groups despite the change in reelection incentives for the winning mayors.
16This is identical to the normalized measure of deforestation used by Assunc¸a˜o et al. (2012, 2013)
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Figure 1.3: Deforestation from 2001-2008 by 2004 incumbent eligible counties
Figure 1.4: Deforestation from 2005-2012 by 2008 incumbent eligible counties
Figure 1.4 is constructed using the same design as Figure 1.3 but compares mayors
who win reelection in 2008 with those who lose. Unlike the previous graph, the election
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year (2008) also corresponds to the introduction of the blacklisting policy. As above, to
the left of 2008, both groups are eligible for reelection and, from 2009 onward, the winning
group is term limited while the losing group is replaced by mayors eligible for reelection in
2012. In contrast to Figure 1.3 after the election, the winning group experiences greater
deforestation in each of the following years. These graphs motivate the formal analysis.
Utilizing the data described above, I examine whether deforestation is greater in
counties with term limited mayors from counties with reelection-eligible mayors both
before and after the introduction of the blacklisting policy via the following difference in
differences model:
yi,t = β1REi,t + β2REi,t × Postt + γXi,t + αi + ηs,t + i,t (1.10)
In this model, yi,t is either of the two deforestation measures described above for
municipality i in year t REi,t is an indicator equal to 1 if a mayor is in his/her first term
and thus eligible for reelection. Postt is an indicator equal to 1 if t is greater than 2008.
I include county-level fixed effects to account for time invariant characteristics within a
county that may influence deforestation as well as state-by-year fixed effects to capture
year-to-year unobserved factors that influence changes in average deforestation within a
given state.
In equation (1.10), β1 estimates the difference in deforestation between reelection
eligible mayors and non reelection ineligible mayors prior to the blacklisting policy. The
difference in deforestation between these two groups after the policy is the sum of β1 and
β2. The predictions put forth by the model suggest that β1 should equal zero and the
sum of β1 and β2 should be positive.
For estimates of β1 to be unbiased, I assume that, conditional on the controls, county
fixed effects and state-by-year fixed effects, there are no unobserved factors that are
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correlated with the reelection status of the mayor in office that would influence defor-
estation. Time variation in reelection eligibility allows for separate identification of β1
from the county fixed effect and the state-by-year fixed effect. This implies that any
threat to identification of β1 must differentially affect reelection eligible counties from
term-limited counties within a given state and year through some channel other than the
eligibility of the mayor to run again for office.
The identifying assumptions for an unbiased estimate of β2 are slightly different than
those for β1. Unlike the traditional difference in differences model, the treatment and
control status of counties changes with each election. The identifying assumption for β2 is
that nothing else changes the relationship of reelection eligibility to deforestation in 2008
other than the introduction of the blacklisting policy. One threat to identification would
occur if the blacklisting policy itself influenced voters to reelect incumbent mayors who
had demonstrated preferences for either high or low deforestation. The estimates of β2 in
this case would not reflect mayoral influence as a function of reelection status, but rather
a systematic change in the preferences of voters. As voters are harmed by blacklisting, the
introduction of the policy should alter their preferences towards politicians more willing
and able to control deforestation, which would push the effect in the opposite direction
of the theory. This effect would only attenuate the estimated differences in deforestation
between reelection eligible mayors and term-limited mayors.
Table 1.3 compares the means of the control variables as well as time-invariant mea-
sures of landowner composition (small family farms versus large landowners) by reelection
eligibility across the three election cycles. There are few differences significant at the 10
percent level, none of which appear in the 2009-2012 election cycle. Table 1.3 indicates
that reelection eligible counties and term limited counties are largely similar on observable
characteristics.
One shortcoming of the empirical analysis is that the deforestation data only covers
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one political cycle after the introduction of the blacklist policy. It could be the case that
mayors now choose to delay deforestation to their second term. While the model suggests
that deforestation should be lower under both first and second term mayors than it would
have been without blacklisting, if the shifting of deforestation from first term to second
term was sufficiently large average deforestation may not change. The empirics here can
only examine the disciplining effect on deforestation for the 2009-2012 political cycle.
1.4.2 Voter punishment in response to blacklisting
To test whether voters punish politicians for blacklisting, I estimate an OLS regression
on two measures of incumbent performance; incumbent vote share and an indicator for
whether the incumbent was reelected. I estimate the relationship between blacklisting
status and the incumbent performance while including controls for previous margin of
victory for the incumbent, the number of total candidates in the election and including
state by party fixed effects.
It should be stressed that the aim of these regressions is to provide suggestive ev-
idence that the reelection mechanism may constrain mayoral behavior. If blacklisting
has no effect on reelection prospects, any differences we observe in deforestation must
be explained by a different channel. It should be cautioned, however, that these esti-
mates should not be interpreted as casual, rather they are intended look for a potentially
meaningful correlation in the data.
1.5 Results
The estimation results for the difference-in-difference model in equation (1.10) are
listed in Table 1.4. Columns (1) and (2) present the preferred specification for the entire
sample on the natural log of deforested area and the standardized measure of deforested
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area respectively. These columns impose the assumption that there were no differences
in deforestation prior to the policy by reelection eligibility. Columns (3) and (4) are
analogous to (1) and (2), but estimate the pre-2008 difference rather than assuming it to
be zero.
The estimates indicate that reelection eligible mayors reduced annual deforestation
10% more than term limited mayors after the policy. This finding is statistically signifi-
cant at the 5% level, using estimated standard errors clustered at the county-level. The
results support the second hypothesis from the model, namely that reelection eligible
mayors will be more responsive to the demand to control deforestation. The estimates
of reelection eligibility on deforestation prior to the policy are not significantly different
from zero, indicating no difference in deforestation from reelection incentives prior to
the policy. This supports the first hypothesis of the model and also rules out political
experience or ability as a confounding factor in the difference in deforestation under the
policy.
Table 1.5 presents the results for the estimation of the effect of blacklisting on incum-
bent performance in 2012 by estimating incumbent vote share, defined as the number
of votes in favor of the incumbent divided by the sum of the number of votes in favor
of the incumbent and the number of votes in favor of the most popular, non-incumbent
candidate. Column (1) begins with the single covariate, an indicator equal to one if
the county was blacklisted in 2008-2011 and zero otherwise. I phase in controls for the
previous margin of victory, a quadratic for number of candidates running in the election
as well as state-by-party fixed effects in columns (2)-(4).
Being blacklisted is correlated with a 5.4-5.7 percentage point reduction in incum-
bent vote share. With the mean incumbent vote share in 2012 just above 50 percent,
this represents an 11 percent reduction. The coefficient estimate in stable across the
specifications and significant at the 5% level with the exception of column (4), where
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estimating the state-by-party fixed effects causes a loss in power.
To compare magnitudes of the direct effect of blacklisting on deforestation and the
reduction associated with reelection eligibility, Table 1.6 presents estimates from equation
(1.10) while including and indicator variable equal to one if the particular county is
blacklisted in a given year. Results indicate that blacklisting lead to a 25% reduction in
deforestation. That the estimate of reelection eligibility remains significant and of the
same magnitude as in Table 1.4 assuages potential concerns that the effect found in Table
1.6 could be driven by differential blacklisting of reelection eligible mayors.
1.6 Robustness Checks
1.6.1 Testing source of reelection eligibility
While term limited mayors may only arrive at their final term by winning two consec-
utive elections, reelection eligible mayors may be serving a first term either because they
beat an incumbent mayor in the previous election or they won an election following a
term limited mayor. To check whether the source of reelection eligibility has a differential
effect on deforestation, I estimate equation 1.10 while separating reelection eligible may-
ors by those who followed a term limited mayor and those who defeated an incumbent.
Table 1.7 presents the coefficient estimates which correspond to those in Table 1.4. The
magnitude of the estimates are very similar by reelection eligibility source. I test whether
the coefficient estimates are equal and report the corresponding p-values in the second
panel of Tabel 1.7. All tests fail to reject that any of the point estimates are significantly
different by reelection eligibility source.
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1.6.2 2004 and 2008 winners
In Table 1.8, I present results from a difference in difference estimate of the effect of
winning an election on deforestation in the following years. In doing so, for each election,
I limit the sample to be only those counties with reelection eligible mayors in office prior
to the election and estimate the following equation.
yi,t = β1Wini × Postt + γXi,t + αi + ηs,t + i,t (1.11)
where Wini is an indicator if the mayor in county i wins the particular election (2004 or
2008) and Postt is an indicator equal to one if the year is past the particular election.
Columns (1) and (2) consider only mayors eligible for the 2004 election and cover years
2002-2008. Prior to 2004, both groups are reelection eligible and after 2004 some mayors
win reelection and are thus term limited. The results indicate no difference in deforesta-
tion as a result of the change in reelection eligibility status. Columns (3) and (4) present
results for the 2008 elections. Estimates indicate that after 2008, counties which won
reelection deforested nearly 9% more than the counties that lost reelection and were thus
reelection eligible. These findings still support the main hypotheses of the model even
while imposing strong restrictions on the data.
1.6.3 Verification with other deforestation data
Deforestation is difficult to quantify and, as mentioned above, there are particular
aspects of the INPE data that may warrant verification with other deforestation data.
The recent release of satellite data on deforestation from Hansen et al. (2013) offers global
estimates of deforested area at the 30 meter by 30 meter (pixel) scale from 2002-2012. I
create an alternative measure of deforested by counting the number of pixels labeled as
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deforested in a given year, meaning the pixel had appreciable forest cover in the previous
year and was determined to have no forest cover in the corresponding year. Unlike the
INPE data, this source is not limited to tree cover changes in amazon forest but will
also measure change in other types of forest (i.e. cerrado). This allows not only for an
opportunity to validate the main findings but also a placebo test, by looking for this
pattern of deforestation in areas of the Legal Amazon with no amazon forest which were
not subject to blacklisting. In the absence of the threat of blacklisting, reelection eligible
mayors should have no incentive to reduce deforestation beyond that of term-limited
mayors.
Columns (1) and (2) in Table 1.9 replicate the main findings of paper with the alter-
native measure of deforestation (the natural log of pixels labeled as deforested in a given
year) in the 639 counties that have in which INPE measures amazon forest deforestation.
I find no difference in deforestation between term-limited counties and non term-limited
counties prior to 2008, and I find deforestation in 10-11% higher in term limited counties
after 2008.
Columns (3) and (4) present results from the same specification, but measuring defor-
estation on the 121 other counties in the legal amazon, but which have no amazon forest
cover and are not measured by the INPE data and are not subject to blacklisting. In
these specifications, I find no difference prior to the policy in term limited and non term
limited counties. Importantly, In Columns (3) and (4) respectively, I find no difference
and a difference in the opposite direction in deforestation after the 2008 policy.
While the findings in Table 1.9 are supportive of the story in this paper, they come
with caveats. The cerrado forest does not provide an adequate control for amazon forest
due to differences in dynamics and deforestation pressures as well as other policies that
apply to the amazon forest only. Furthermore, the small sample size of the non amazon
forest group as well as the small amount of forest cover imply that these measures are
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likely to contain more noise than the deforestation measures in of amazon forest counties.
Regarding the data itself, it is unclear whether deforestation measured in this dataset
corresponds to clearing of primary forest or secondary forests (plantations, etc.) and in
some cases, soy farms have been classified as forest cover (Tropek et al., 2014).
1.6.4 Limiting Sample to 2005-2012
As discussed in Section 2, prior to the real-time satellite monitoring introduced in
2004, there was little de facto enforcement of deforestation. The estimates of pre-blacklist
difference in deforestation by reelection eligibility in Table 1.4 are estimated from a period
of little deforestation monitoring and a period of private enforcement (but no collective
punishment). The model predicts that differences by reelection eligibility will only occur
under the threat of collective punishment. Table 1.10 estimates equation (1.10) while
limiting the sample to the 2005 to 2012 period to verify that the evidence in favor of
the two model hypotheses regarding deforestation are not driven by a period of little
enforcement. The coefficient estimates are similar in magnitude to those in Table 1.4
which indicates that the findings are not driven by the early 2002-2004 period.
1.6.5 Reelection outcomes and blacklisting
To show that blacklisting had a measurable impact on whether or not a politician won
reelection, Table 1.11 presents estimates from a linear probability model of reelection in
2012 as a function of blacklisting status.17 The columns in Table 1.11 are analogous to
those in Table 1.5. Results indicate that mayors running for reelection were reelected
16% less often if they were blacklisted than mayors in counties that were not blacklisted.
17The linear probability model is used in place of a nonlinear probit model to allow for the inclusion
of state by party fixed effects in the final column.
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1.7 Concluding Remarks
In the report evaluating local institutions and deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon,
May et al. (2010) state, “A chronic problem in the Amazon is elite capture of public
institutions with regulatory responsibilities for access to and use of forest resources, for
private economic and political interests, associated with land speculation, illegal logging,
cattle ranching, tax evasion, drug trafficking, patron-client relationships and electoral
campaigns.” (page 36) Any policy aimed to slow deforestation in the Amazon (as well as
other tropical forest rich countries) must face the reality that the local political context
may impede effectiveness or even make certain policies untenable.
This paper seeks to better understand how local political incentives affect deforesta-
tion in Brazil. When the demands of the electorate are aligned with natural resource use
that maximizes private rents, politicians face little trade off between private rents and
reelection. However, when the demands of the electorate change - as in the case of the
collective punishment policy - so as to no longer favor private rent maximizing resource
use, reelection eligible politicians slow deforestation more than their term-limited coun-
terparts. In the absence of political accountability, local political authority over forest
resources may lead to patterns of forest use that are at odds with the electorate.
This paper presents a model of lobbying and deforestation with mayors who seek
reelection. The equilibrium of the model suggests that, under the threat of blacklisting,
reelection eligible mayors are more likely to limit deforestation in order to win reelection
and reelection ineligible mayors are more likely to increase deforestation at the expense
of the voters.
The data supports these predictions. Using variation in term limit status, there is no
difference in deforestation by reelection eligibility prior to the blacklisting policy. After
the policy, reelection eligible mayors reduce deforestation 10% more than their reelection
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ineligible counterparts. The evidence suggests that voters do in fact punish mayors when
their county is blacklisted. They offer blacklisted incumbents less vote share in the
following election and reelect them at lower rates.
Many have argued that the decentralization of forest authority to the local level may
be effective to slow deforestation. The findings of this paper suggest that such policies
should consider local political institutions as decentralization could create more rents for
local politicians if voters are unable to hold politicians accountable for their actions.
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Table 1.3: Covariate Balance by Election Cycle
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Table 1.4: Difference in Differences Results from Model of Reelection Eligibility on
Deforestation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(Defor) SD defor ln(Defor) SD defor
Reelection Eligible 0.0358 0.0244
(0.0282) (0.0341)
Reelection Eligible x Post -0.0964** -0.103** -0.138* -0.132**
(0.0474) (0.0425) (0.0599) (0.0609)
Observations 7,029 7,029 7,029 7,029
R-squared (within) 0.460 0.382 0.461 0.384
Number of counties 639 639 639 639
The dependent variable in columns (1) and (3) is the natural log of deforested area
as measured in square kilometers, the dependent variable in columns (2) and (4) is a
normalized measure of deforestation measured in standard deviations. All regressions
include county fixed effects, state-by-year fixed effects, agricultural controls and pro-
tected area and cover 2002 to 2012. Standard errors are in parenthesis and clustered
at the county level. Asterisks correspond to the following p-values: *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 1.5: Incumbent vote share in 2012 elections and blacklisting
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Blacklisted -0.0546** -0.0556** -0.0570** -0.0540*
(0.0248) (0.0243) (0.0220) (0.0311)
Prev Margin of Victory 0.229** 0.211** 0.244**
(0.0997) (0.0883) (0.109)
Number of Candidates -0.0976*** -0.0996**
(0.0337) (0.0431)
Number of Candidates2 0.00663 0.00691
(0.00429) (0.00574)
State x Party Fixed Effects No No No Yes
Observations 365 365 365 365
R-squared 0.007 0.025 0.157 0.417
Standard errors are in parenthesis and clustered at the state level. Asterisks corre-
spond to the following p-values: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.6: Results from Model of Reelection Eligibility and Blacklisting on Deforestation
(1) (2)
ln(Defor) SD defor
Reelection Eligible x Post -0.0964** -0.104**
(0.0474) (0.0425)
Blacklist -0.252*** -0.192***
(0.0789) (0.0519)
Observations 7,029 7,029
R-squared (within) 0.462 0.384
Number of counties 639 639
The dependent variable in column (1) is the natural log of deforested area
as measured in square kilometers, the dependent variable in columns (2) is
a normalized measure of deforestation measured in standard deviations. All
regressions include county fixed effects, state-by-year fixed effects, agricultural
controls and protected area and cover 2002 to 2012. Standard errors are in
parenthesis and clustered at the county level. Asterisks correspond to the
following p-values: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.7: Reelection Eligibility by eligibility type on Deforestation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(Defor) SD defor ln(Defor) SD defor
Reel Elig via Term 0.0298 0.0480
(0.0333) (0.0463)
Reel Elig via nonTerm 0.0386 0.0155
(0.0396) (0.0409)
Reel Elig via Term x Post -0.0826 -0.118** -0.127 -0.182**
(0.0591) (0.0519) (0.0804) (0.0848)
Reel Elig via nonTerm x Post -0.103** -0.0955** -0.144** -0.110*
(0.0513) (0.0456) (0.0666) (0.0652)
P-value of equality on Pre 0.839 0.493
P-value of equality on Post 0.704 0.630 0.823 0.336
Observations 7,029 7,029 7,029 7,029
R-squared (within) 0.460 0.384 0.461 0.385
Number of counties 639 639 639 639
The dependent variable in columns (1) and (3) is the natural log of deforested area as
measured in square kilometers, the dependent variable in columns (2) and (4) is a normalized
measure of deforestation measured in standard deviations. All regressions include county
fixed effects, state-by-year fixed effects, agricultural controls and protected area and cover
2002 to 2012. Standard errors are in parenthesis and clustered at the county level. Asterisks
correspond to the following p-values: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.8: Reelection eligible counties, electoral outcomes and deforestation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(Defor) SD defor ln(Defor) SD defor
2004 Election 2008 Election
Election Won x Post Election -0.0436 -0.0260 0.0881* 0.0951**
(0.0630) (0.0827) (0.0468) (0.0480)
Years 2002 - 2008 2005 - 2012
Observations 2,289 2,289 3,944 3,944
R-squared (within) 0.326 0.292 0.434 0.362
Number of counties 327 327 493 493
The dependent variable in columns (1) and (3) is the natural log of deforested area as
measured in square kilometers, the dependent variable in columns (2) and (4) is a nor-
malized measure of deforestation measured in standard deviations. Columns (1) and (2)
restrict the sample to only counties with mayors eligible for reelection in 2004. Columns
(3) and (4) restrict the sample to only counties with mayors eligible for reelection in 2008.
All regressions include county fixed effects, state-by-year fixed effects, agricultural controls
and protected area. Standard errors are in parenthesis and clustered at the county level.
Asterisks correspond to the following p-values: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.9: Results from Model of Reelection Eligibility on Deforestation in Amazon
and Non Amazon forest
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(Defor) ln(Defor) ln(Defor) ln(Defor)
Amazon Forest Non Amazon Forest
Reelection Eligible -0.0155 0.0278
(0.0439) (0.0366)
Reelection Eligible x Post -0.118*** -0.0994** 0.0975 0.0647
(0.0350) (0.0439) (0.0650) (0.0831)
Observations 7,029 7,029 1,331 1,331
R-squared (within) 0.486 0.386 0.392 0.392
Number of counties 639 639 121 121
The dependent variable in all columns is the natural log of deforested 30 meter by 30
meter pixels. Columns (1) and (2) include counties in other INPE specifications, and
columns (3) and (4) include counties with no amazon forest but lie in the legal amazon.
All regressions include county fixed effects, state-by-year fixed effects, agricultural
controls and protected area and cover 2002 to 2012. Standard errors are in parenthesis
and clustered at the county level. Asterisks correspond to the following p-values: ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.10: Difference in Differences Results from Model of Reelection Eligibility on
Deforestation after 2004
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(Defor) SD defor ln(Defor) SD defor
Reelection Eligible 0.0187 0.0170
(0.0498) (0.0509)
Reelection Eligible x Post -0.0784* -0.0970** -0.103 -0.0744
(0.0430) (0.0424) (0.0787) (0.0812)
Observations 5,112 5,112 5,112 5,112
R-squared (within) 0.430 0.351 0.430 0.351
Number of counties 639 639 639 639
The dependent variable in columns (1) and (3) is the natural log of deforested area
as measured in square kilometers, the dependent variable in columns (2) and (4) is a
normalized measure of deforestation measured in standard deviations. All regressions
include county fixed effects, state-by-year fixed effects, agricultural controls and pro-
tected area and cover 2005 to 2012. Standard errors are in parenthesis and clustered
at the county level. Asterisks correspond to the following p-values: *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.11: 2012 Incumbent reelection indicator and blacklisting
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Blacklisted -0.155 -0.159* -0.159* -0.0598
(0.0999) (0.0933) (0.0946) (0.119)
Prev Margin of Victory 1.070*** 1.042*** 1.097***
(0.290) (0.274) (0.310)
Number of Candidates -0.138 -0.189*
(0.0865) (0.103)
Number of Candidates2 0.00779 0.0120
(0.0108) (0.0131)
State x Party Fixed Effects No No No Yes
Observations 365 365 365 365
R-squared 0.006 0.044 0.078 0.336
Results from a linear probability model using an indicator of incumbent victory as
the dependent variable. Standard errors are in parenthesis and clustered at the state
level. Asterisks correspond to the following p-values: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Chapter 2
The Underground Economy of Fake
Antivirus Software
2.1 Introduction
Over the past few years, electronic crimes revolving around a class of malware known
as scareware have become extremely lucrative ventures. The concept is simple; design a
ploy through social engineering that exploits a computer user’s fear of revealing sensitive
information, losing important data, and/or causing irreversible hardware damage. The
most common form of scareware is fake antivirus (AV) software, also known as “rogue
security software.” More specifically, a fake AV program impersonates an antivirus scan-
ner and displays misleading or fraudulent alerts in an attempt to dupe a victim into
purchasing a license for a commercial version that is capable of removing nonexistent
security threats. Some fake AV programs may also lock down system functionality to
prevent victims from accessing files or web sites or from creating new processes, such
as Windows Explorer, Task Manager, and a Command Prompt under the false pretense
that it is for the victim’s own protection. In addition, we have observed fake AV soft-
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ware that contains hidden backdoor capabilities, enabling the program to be used for
other malicious purposes, such as launching distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks
against adversaries.
Over the past year, we have been able to acquire backend servers for several multi-
million dollar criminal operations selling fake AV products. These fake AV businesses
are run out of Eastern Europe and utilize affiliate networks known as partnerka to dis-
tribute the rogue software (Samosseiko, 2009). These partnerka networks use various
pseudonyms, and operate by recruiting affiliates to install their software on as many
computers as possible. In exchange, the affiliates receive a commission for driving traffic
to landing pages, malware installations (also known as loads), and fake AV sales. More-
over, some partnerka offer additional incentives to the most successful affiliates with
prizes including expensive cars, computers, and cell phones Krebs (2009a).
Since we have access to the servers used by these criminal organizations, we are
able to directly analyze the tools that are used to create the fake AV products, including
programs that assist perpetrators in controlling the malware’s behavior and brand names,
as well as custom packers that obfuscate the malware to evade detection by legitimate
antivirus products. Some fake AV groups even make use of third-party commercial
services to track the detection rates by the most popular antivirus vendors (e.g., McAfee,
Symantec, and Trend Micro) Krebs (2009b), and they tweak their obfuscation algorithms
until a low detection rate is achieved. We also have access to the instruments that are
used to direct traffic to fake AV web sites, the infrastructure that prolongs the longevity
of the operations, and a very detailed view of the financial profits that fuel these illicit
enterprises. Interestingly, the miscreants behind fake AV products even offer refunds to
victims who are persistent, in order to reduce the amount of credit card chargebacks,
which we will discuss in more detail later.
Although various aspects of fake AV software have been studied, there are many
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facets of these operations that are not well understood, including the modus operandi
of the criminals, the amount of money involved, the victims who purchase the software,
the affiliate networks that promote the campaigns, and the flow of money from the
victims’ credit cards, to the payment processors, to the bank accounts controlled by
the criminals. In this paper, we attempt to fill this void by presenting the analysis of
several criminal organizations that sell fake AV products. More specifically, we make the
following contributions: First, we provide an in-depth analysis of fake AV operations and
present detailed statistics based on the analysis of more than a dozen servers belonging
to several criminal organizations. This is the most comprehensive, large-scale study of
fake AV campaigns that highlights different aspects of their operations from the infection
process, to the financial complexities of maintaining a fraudulent business. Second, we
examine how fake AV campaigns are managed and orchestrated, from the ringleaders’
point of view. We discuss the software infrastructure that is utilized, the functionality it
provides, and its role in the underground economy. lastly, we present an economic model
that encapsulates financial patterns that are indicative of fake AV ventures. Our intent is
to formalize the essential factors of these operations and to identify potential weaknesses
that can be exploited to increase the criminals’ functional and operational costs.
2.2 Technical Background
Before we present the financial logistics, we first discuss the methods that are utilized
to infect machines with fake AV software and the infrastructure behind the process.
In addition, we present details about three particular criminal operations running fake
AV businesses. To protect ongoing law enforcement investigations, we refer to these
three ventures as AV1, AV2, and AV3. Note that we currently see ongoing activity (e.g.,
new malware samples, installations and online advertisements) from all three fake AV
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operations.
2.2.1 Infection Methods
There are three primary infection methods used by fake AV distributors to propagate
their malware: social engineering, drive-by-download attacks, and botnets. In this sec-
tion, we present how these strategies are used to infect as many computers as possible
with fake AV malware.
One of the most popular infection methods uses social engineering techniques to
convince a victim to voluntarily install the fake AV. To launch this attack, a malicious
web page displays a window in the browser (e.g., via JavaScript or Adobe Flash) that
pretends that the machine has been infected with malware. An example is shown in
Figure 2.1. To fix the security problem, the window also contains a link to a program
that presumably helps to clean up the infection. Of course, this program is the fake AV
software that attackers aim to install.
A second technique to install fake AV software is via drive-by download attacks. In
a drive-by download attack, a web site is prepared with malicious scripts that exploit
vulnerabilities in the web browser or one of its plugins. When the exploit is successful,
the fake AV malware is installed automatically, without the user’s knowledge or consent.
Both in the case of fake alerts and drive-by downloads, the initial goal of the attacker
is to drive as many web visitors to their malicious web pages (sometimes called landing
pages) as possible. In order to achieve this objective, attackers often make use of blackhat
search engine optimization (SEO). Their intention is to poison search engine results by
creating landing pages that contain popular search phrases. Many of these campaigns
target current events such as the death of a celebrity, natural disasters, and holidays.
Blackhat SEO relies on the fact that when search engine crawlers index a web site they
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Figure 2.1: Alerts from a fake antivirus advertisement.
identify themselves through the HTTP User-Agent field (e.g., googlebot). Thus, a site
under an attacker’s control can serve content that contains popular keywords that a search
engine will use in the computation of the page rank. If the process is done correctly, the
landing page is ranked high in the search engine’s results for these popular keywords.
When a user clicks on a search engine result that leads to a blackhat SEO landing
page, the server analyzes the user’s web browser (via the User-Agent header), and the
referring web site (through the HTTP Referer field). The tools that are used to man-
age these SEO campaigns are known in the underground economy as a traffic direction
system (TDS). These TDSs can leverage the header information to distinguish between
search engine bots and web browsers. In order to avoid detection, TDSs often take addi-
tional countermeasures such as resolving the visitor’s IP address to a geographic location
and recording the number of accesses. Once the TDS has verified the traffic, a user is
redirected a number of times to a landing page. This landing page will then launch a
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social engineering or drive-by download attack, as described previously.
Note that most TDSs also define a time-to-live (TTL) value that specifies how long
a particular redirection URL will remain active. Most TTL values are very short, which
makes it more difficult for security researchers to track active campaigns.
An alternative approach to using blackhat SEO techniques for traffic generation is to
exploit the distribution systems and ubiquity of online ad networks. An attacker may
compromise a legitimate ad network, or sign up as an advertiser to display malicious
advertisements disguised as free pornography, missing audio/video codecs, or virus scans
that perform similar social engineering attacks to con visitors into installing their mal-
ware. Online ad networks are also frequently used in conjunction with drive-by-download
attacks, known collectively as malvertisements, to covertly install the fake AV software
(without user interaction or permission).
A third infection method is through botnets, a collection of compromised computers
under the control of an attacker. Several large botnets, such as Koobface, Conficker,
and Bredolab, have been known to distribute fake AV software to machines under their
control, which is believed to be one of their top sources of revenue (Kirk, 2010; Poulsen,
2009; Villeneuve et al., 2010).
Once fake AV software has been installed on the victim’s machine (either voluntarily
through social engineering or involuntarily through a drive-by attack or botnet), intru-
sive nags will be shown continuously to the victim, warning of “malware infections” or
“intrusion attempts” that pose a risk to the user’s system. At this point, the fake AV
software usually advertises itself as a free trial version with limited functionality (i.e.,
detection only). If a victim wants to remove the malware infections, they must upgrade
to a commercial version by purchasing a license key. When a victim clicks the software’s
purchase button, they are taken to one of the fake AV company’s web sites. After a
victim enters their personal information and credit card, they are sent a license key (e.g.,
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through email) that essentially deactivates the bogus malware alerts, providing the user
with a sense that their purchase was valuable.
2.2.2 Infrastructure
Similar to any other legitimate online business, when a fake AV company’s servers are
down, they lose potential revenue streams. Therefore, there are a number of measures
that these organizations take to ensure the availability of their infrastructure. The first
strategy is to deploy an array of proxy servers that are publicly visible. The sole purpose
of these proxies is to relay content to one or more backend servers as shown in Figure 2.2.
More specifically, these machines communicate directly with users that are redirected to
a landing page or infected hosts that purchase a license. The proxy servers are typically
partitioned depending on the specific role that they fulfill (e.g., TDS servers are not
reused for relaying sales information). The main purpose of the front-end servers is to
thwart mitigation efforts. Hence, taking down one, or even several, of these machines
often has little impact, since the domain name address records that point to these servers
can be changed quickly and easily. These front-end servers are designed to be lightweight
and expendable, and typically have an automated deployment program that accelerates
the process of creating new proxy nodes.
The main drawback of proxies (from an attacker’s point of view) is that when a
defender obtains access to one of these front-end servers (or monitors their ingress and
egress network traffic), she can learn the location of the backend infrastructure. To
address this problem and to further hide the location of the backend, the miscreants of
fake AV operations may use multiple tiers of proxy servers. However, each extra tier will
introduce additional network delay that could make a user who is purchasing a fake AV
product more suspicious. In our experience, most fake AV operations use only one tier
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of proxy nodes. Thus, we were able to locate the backend infrastructure by tracking the
network traffic from an infected host to a proxy node to the backend servers. By taking
down the backend servers, the entire fake AV operation is disrupted (i.e., servers relaying
sales, malware installations, and TDS become inoperable).
A second, important strategy is to register a large number of domain names. The
domain names fulfill several purposes. First, it makes the fake AV web site look more
legitimate (e.g., the domains are usually related to antivirus or security keywords). Sec-
ond, the large number of domains makes takedown efforts more difficult, since the DNS
records can be changed to point to any of their proxy servers. In addition, the reputation
of a fake AV domain will decline as more people are defrauded, and many of the domains
will become blacklisted. As a result, domain registrars may ultimately suspend some of
the fake AV domains. Overall, the AV1 crew purchased 276 domains, 17 front-end servers,
and one back-end server. Similarly the AV2 operation registered at least 188 domains,
managed 16 front-end servers, and two back-end servers. We did not have complete vis-
ibility over the total number of domains used by AV3, but from our observations, the
infrastructure was similar to the others with a large number of free domains registered
through the co.cc top-level domain (TLD), and approximately 20 front-end servers, and
one back-end server.
2.3 Data Collection
In the following section, we describe the process that facilitated our efforts in obtain-
ing access to these fake antivirus backend servers and the data we collected. The main
tool that we utilized to analyze the fake AV malware was Anubis, a system that dy-
namically analyzes binary programs via runtime analysis (Bayer et al., 2009b). Anubis
runs a Windows executable and documents the program’s behavior, including system
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Figure 2.2: Tiered infrastructure for many online criminal operations
We were able to obtain copies of three different fake AV organization’s backend servers (in the shaded
circle above) that control the entire operation.
modifications, processes creation, and network activity. Anubis is able to process on the
order of tens of thousands of samples per day, providing us with a comprehensive view
of the current malware landscape (Bayer et al., 2009a).
By searching through the network connections logged in the Anubis database, we
were able to identify a number of unique network signatures commonly used by fake
antivirus software. More specifically, when fake AV is installed, it often phones home, by
connecting back to servers under the control of the fake AV criminal organization. For
example, infected machines made an HTTP to notify the criminals of the installation
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and to credit the affiliate responsible for the infection. The parameters p and s provided
details about the type and name of the malware
After observing network signatures associated with these fake AVs, we contacted the
hosting providers whose servers were being used for controlling these operations. We
provided them with network traces, malware samples, and other evidence that revealed
the location of the servers that were situated within their network. The hosting providers
responded by taking these servers down, and they provided us with direct access to the
information stored on them. Note that we had previously collaborated with a number of
these vigilant ISPs in the U.S. and abroad through FIRE (Stone-Gross et al., 2009b), our
network reputation service that tracks where malicious content resides on the Internet.
In total, we were able to get a complete snapshot of 21 servers: 17 of which were proxy
nodes, and 4 of which were backend servers. The information that we collected from
these servers included data for AV1 for approximately 3 months from January through
April 2010, 16 months from January 2009 through May 2010 for AV2, and from March
2008 through August 2010 for AV3. From these data sources, we have a view of nearly
the entire operation including web site source code, samples of the fake AV malware,
and databases. The most interesting information is contained in the database records,
which document everything from malware installations, fake AV sales, refunds, technical
support conversations to the TDSs controlling the fake AV landing pages.
2.4 Following the Money Trail
Now that we have provided a summary of the fake AV infrastructure and our data
sources, we will focus on the financial aspects that drive the sales of fake AV software.
In particular, we analyze the flow of money from a victim to the criminals and their
affiliates. In addition, we examine the ways in which the fake AV groups manage to stay
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under the radar when interacting with credit card payment processors.
2.4.1 Transaction Process
Before we present the detailed statistics of sales, revenue, chargebacks and refunds,
we introduce an overview of the various entities involved in a fake antivirus business.
The transaction process, as shown in Figure 2.3, begins when a victim purchases the
rogue AV software. This purchase is done through the fake AV company’s web site (Step
1), where the victim enters her credit card information. The fake AV business (i.e., the
merchant) then submits the credit card data to a third-party payment processor (Step
2). The payment processor forwards the information through one of the major credit
card companies (Step 3), who requests authorization from the credit card issuer (Step 4).
If the credit card issuer (i.e., a bank) approves the transaction, the victim’s credit card
is charged (Step 5), and the credit card company notifies the payment processor of the
successful sale. Periodically (e.g., biweekly or monthly), the payment processor deposits
funds into bank accounts set up by the fake AV businesses (Step 6). The ringleaders
of the fake AV operation then withdraw the funds (Step 7) and pay a commission to
their affiliates (Step 8). We will provide more details about this process in the following
sections.
2.4.2 Sales
There are a number of factors that contribute to whether a victim purchases a li-
cense, such as the aggressiveness of the fake AV software (e.g., frequency of alerts, type
of threats, and whether system performance is affected). In addition, the price and sub-
scription models offered by most fake antivirus products play an interesting role, with
subscriptions that range from 6-month licenses to lifetime licenses. The AV1 operation
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Figure 2.3: High-level overview of the transaction process for fake antivirus businesses.
offered licenses for 6-months at $49.95, 1-year at $59.95, and 2-years at $69.95. These
options were purchased almost uniformly with rates of 34.8%, 32.9%, and 32.3%, re-
spectively. The AV2 company’s products also offered 6-month licenses at $49.95, 1-year
at $69.95, and a lifetime license at $89.95. The 6-month option was the most popular
(61.9%), followed by the lifetime license (24.6%) and the 1-year license (13.5%). The
products sold by AV3 were priced at $59.95 for a 1-year license and $79.95 for a life-
time license. All of AV3’s products were also bundled with a mandatory $19.95 fee for
24x7 customer support services, bringing the total price to $79.90 for the yearly license
(purchased by 83.2% of victims) and $99.90 (purchased by 16.8% of the victims) for the
lifetime license.
In total, AV1 “trial” products were installed 8,403,008 times, which resulted in 189,342
sales, or upgrades to the “commercial” version (a conversion rate of 2.4%) in only 3
months. Likewise, AV2’s programs were installed 6,624,508 times, with 137,219 victims
that purchased the fake antivirus over 16 months. That is a conversion rate of approx-
imately 2.1%. The AV3 business sold 1,969,953 licenses out of 91,305,640 installations
from March 2008 through August 2010 (a conversion rate of approximately 2.2%).
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The total victim loss from the three fake AV operations was $11,303,494, $5,046,508,
and $116,941,854 from AV1, AV2, and AV3, respectively. Figure 2.4 shows the cumulative
daily revenue for each of these fake antivirus operations. If we extrapolate these profits
over one year, the AV1 crew was on track to earn more than $45 million dollars per year,
while the AV2 group earned approximately $3.8 million per year. The largest and most
profitable operation was AV3, which raked in an average of $48.4 million dollars per year.
As we will discuss in Section 2.4.4, some credit card transactions were reported to be
fraudulent and were credited back to the victim. Interestingly, victim complaints force
these illegitimate firms into a complex position with their payment processors, as we will
discuss in the following sections.
2.4.3 Payment Processors
An interesting facet of fake AV sales is the process in which credit card transactions
are handled. In particular, payment processors (also known as payment service providers)
are an integral part of every sale. Without these processors, fake AV operations would
not be able to accept credit card payments. This would make it not only harder for
a victim to purchase the product (i.e., they would have to use an alternative form of
payment, such as cash, check, or money order), but it would also likely raise red flags
that the software may be fraudulent. Note that payment processors must maintain a
degree of legitimacy, or they risk losing the ability to accept major credit cards. For
instance, a payment processor known as ePassporte lost the rights to accept Visa credit
cards, due to a large amount of fraudulent transactions, money laundering, and other
questionable activities (Krebs, 2010a). Note that the AV2 crew at one point set up an
ePassporte merchant account for processing credit card transactions.
Perhaps the most notorious payment service provider is Chronopay, which is head-
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Figure 2.4: Three criminal organizations’ revenue from fake antivirus sales.
The solid line displays the total revenue, while the dotted line displays the revenue net of chargebacks
and refunds.
quartered in the Netherlands and operated by Russian businessmen. Chronopay has
long been associated with processing transactions for various forms of online criminal
organizations (Mick, 2010). However, Chronopay also provides legitimate services to
large organizations such as Electronic Arts, Kaspersky, and charities including the World
Wildlife Federation, Greenpeace, and UNICEF. Because the volume of legitimate trans-
actions from these businesses may far outweigh the fraudulent activities, major credit
card companies may be hesitant to sever ties with Chronopay. Note that all three fake
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AV businesses that we analyzed used Chronopay’s credit card payment services.
There were several other, smaller payment processors that the fake AV operations
used for credit card transactions. Interestingly, we found communications between one
of these small payment processors and the fake AV perpetrators that revealed that the
payment service provider was well aware of the fake AV business and even offered ad-
vice to help the group sell more products. There are a number of tricks that some of
these dishonest payment service providers perform in order to benefit from fraudulent
transactions. First, payment processors may offer high-risk merchant accounts, where
the processor may earn close to 15% for each transaction. These are typically for ques-
tionable businesses that have significant problems with customer complaints (e.g., online
pharmacies or pornography). Second, we observed that some of these payment proces-
sors allow an illicit company to create multiple merchant accounts in which transactions
are periodically rotated (approximately every 30-45 days) through each account, such
that a single account is never flagged for fraudulent activities, since the transactions are
distributed over all of the accounts.
2.4.4 Chargebacks and Refunds
Interestingly, all three fake antivirus groups that we studied offered a certain number
of refunds to individuals who requested them. At first, it may seem counter-intuitive for
a criminal operation that is selling fraudulent products to provide refunds to victims.
However, it is important to keep in mind that these criminal organizations have to use
legitimate (or semi-legitimate) credit card payment processors for every transaction. In
addition, payment processors are required by statutory (federal regulations) and contrac-
tual obligations (PCI) to provide various levels of consumer protection against theft and
fraudulent purchases. When a victim reports a fraudulent transaction to their credit card
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issuer, they are issued a credit, which is known as a chargeback. If a business receives too
many chargeback complaints, the payment processor may sever ties with the company
and prohibit further credit card transactions. Therefore, it is important to minimize the
number of chargebacks, which has the effect of extending the lifetime of the fake AV
operation.
Overall, AV1 granted 5,669 refunds (3% of sales) at a cost of $346,039 (in addition
to 1,544 chargebacks worth $94,963). In comparison, AV2 issued 11,681 refunds (or 8.5%
of sales) at a cost of $759,666 (in addition to 3,024 chargebacks valued at $183,107).
AV3 refunded 151,553 (7.1% of sales) for a total of $10,951,191 (with 30,743 chargebacks
valued at $2,225,430). Note that the primary credit card processor for AV3 temporarily
froze AV3’s merchant account for approximately one month in March 2009, due to a high
number of chargebacks. After this incident, AV3 offered more refunds, and the number
of chargebacks dropped accordingly.
Another important factor that has an impact on chargebacks and refunds is how
frequently a fake AV business changes the name of their product. This is due to the
fact that after a short interval (typically 3-7 days), victim complaints start appearing
on consumer web forums that are in turn indexed by search engines. Thus, a victim
may perform a Google search for the name of the fake AV and find that other users have
similar grievances and complaints. Interestingly, we found that AV2 had significant server
problems and maintained the same product names for an extended period of time. As a
result, they had the highest chargeback and refund rates.
As we will discuss in Section 2.6, the amount and timing of refunds follows an in-
teresting pattern, which indicates that the criminals maximize their profits by refunding
just enough sales to remain under a payment processors chargeback limit.
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2.4.5 Affiliate Programs
The financial incentives for cybercrime play an important role both in the type and
amount of fraud. In order to infect as many machines as possible and therefore maximize
sales, fake AV businesses rely upon affiliate networks based primarily in Eastern Europe
known as partnerka. The backend servers that we obtained contained payment records to
these partners. The profits for some of the affiliates are immense, with members earning
as much as 30-80% commission from sales leads. Remarkably, the top affiliate of AV1
made more than $1.8 million dollars in approximately two months. Over the course of
these two months, there were a total of 44 affiliates who were paid (out of 140 that
enrolled), with four earning more than $500,000, 11 in excess of $100,000, and 15 more
than $50,000. The average affiliate income was approximately $60,000 per month. In
comparison, AV2 had 98 active affiliates out of 167 total registered, and stored records
for 9 months of payments to these affiliates. Overall, five of these affiliates made more
than $300,000, 16 earned more than $100,000, and 22 earned more than $50,000. The
AV3 operation had a total of 1,107 affiliates with 541 who were active. The top AV3
affiliate earned $3.86 million, and three others made more than $1 million. There were
15 AV3 affiliates that earned over $100,000, and 23 that were paid more than $50,000.
By comparing the affiliate email addresses across the three different fake AV part-
nerka, we were able to determine that 70 affiliate members were involved in multiple
groups. Interestingly, there was one affiliate who was associated with all three fake AV
businesses.
The affiliate payments were made through WebMoney, a virtual electronic currency.
There are several advantages that WebMoney provides for criminal activities. In par-
ticular, all transactions are anonymous and irreversible. That is, once a transfer has
occurred it cannot be voided, regardless of whether it was fraudulent. Other benefits
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include a very low transaction fee (0.8%), and a large number of places, especially in
Eastern Europe, that will exchange WebMoney for local currencies.
2.4.6 Shell Companies
One of the most important parts of the financial system from a fake AV company’s
perspective is the ability to cash out earned funds. Thus, a fake AV company must open
one or more bank accounts to receive merchant remittances from their payment proces-
sors. These accounts are typically set up and registered to fictitious shell companies.
We observed accounts registered primarily in Europe and Asia, including the Czech Re-
public, Finland, Cypress, and Israel. Once money is deposited into a shell account, the
ringleaders can directly withdraw the funds. However, criminals who are more cautious
may opt to use the services of money mules. A money mule is a person who is recruited
(usually under the pretense of a work from home job) to accept a bank deposit, withdraw
the funds, and wire the money (minus a service fee) back to the criminals. This greatly
minimizes the risk that a criminal will be apprehended when receiving funds. Unfortu-
nately, we were not able to determine the precise method used by these three fake AV
groups to withdraw funds. Nevertheless, we believe the money was probably picked up
directly by the ringleaders (or one of their close associates), based on the geographic
locations of the bank accounts.
2.5 Victims
In this section, we analyze the victims that purchased fake AV software. In par-
ticular, we will study various characteristics of victims including: geographic location,
operating systems, and institutions. In addition, we will examine the technical support
and customer service provided by the three fake AV businesses.
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The largest concentration of victims (by far) was in the U.S. (76.9%) followed by the
U.K., Canada, and Australia. This is likely due to the fact that the fake antivirus prod-
ucts are primarily written for English speakers (only a few of them had been translated
to other languages). The most popular, compromised operating systems were Windows
XP (54.2%), Windows Vista (30.8%), and Windows 7 (14.8%). Internet Explorer 7 was
the most commonly used browser (65.6%). The most frequently used email addresses of
customers of fake AV products were Yahoo, Hotmail, AOL, Gmail, and Comcast. Other
residential ISPs placed in the top 10 including AT&T, SBC Global, Verizon, and Bell-
south. This indicates that most victims probably purchased the fake AV software for
their personal computers at home. However, there were a number of sales from victims
at commercial, government, and military institutions.
All three of the fake AV companies offered various forms of customer service and
technical support. Customer service for fraudulent products may seem contradictory,
but its purpose is clear: to reduce the number of refunds and victim complaints. Overall,
the fake AV groups offered two types of support systems. The first was an online system
where victims could open tickets describing their problems, and technical support repre-
sentatives would periodically reply to these tickets. The second type of support system
was an interactive, live chat service, where a victim would talk in real-time with technical
support personnel.
We were able to observe the communications in many of these support systems, and
analyze how operators responded to questions, and how they handled irate customers.
For the most part, victims were upset, realized that the fake AV software was a scam, and
requested instructions for removing the malware from their system. The fake AV repre-
sentatives typically responded with removal directions, but they warned users that their
computer was still infected and made claims that competitors (i.e., legitimate antivirus
vendors) were slandering their products.
66
The Underground Economy of Fake Antivirus Software Chapter 2
We also performed automated data mining techniques to determine the relationship
between complaints, sales, chargebacks, and refunds. To this end, we queried the fake AV
groups’ internal databases for patterns such as credit card numbers, unique identifiers
(e.g., orders), email addresses, and various keywords (e.g., fraud, scam, refund, etc) that
were relevant to disgruntled customer reactions. By correlating these database records,
we examined whether a victim who purchased a fake AV product later filed a complaint
through any of the support forums, and if a refund or chargeback was issued. Overall,
only a small percentage (less than 10%) of victims actually sought refunds, and those
who were issued refunds received their credit within 7 days on average. Note that the
low rates of victim complaints that we discovered are similar to those reported by the
computer security news investigation web site, KrebsOnSecurity (Krebs, 2010b).
2.6 Economic Model
In this section, we utilize the data that we have collected to identify behavior that
is representative of a fake AV business. We then propose an economic model based on a
key observation of refunds that may be used to detect other businesses that are engaged
in illegal activities.
2.6.1 Refund Patterns
Fake antivirus software firms (hereafter, firms) act to maximize profits. To do so, the
firms rely not only on the systematic transfer of funds to their accounts, but also on a
return flow of refunds that mimics the behavior of legitimate providers. As this flow of
refunds provides a clear pattern of behavior, we model the refund flow with consideration
toward using it to detect and punish firms.
The flow of funds, and refunds, depends on two key players that act as intermediaries
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between the buyer of the fake software and the firm. As outlined in Figure 2.3, the
payment processor is a key player that serves to transmit credit information from the
buyer to the credit card network. The second key player is the credit card network,
which incorporates both the actual card company (e.g. Visa) and the bank that issues
the card (and thereby hosts the buyer’s account). The payment flow is from the buyer,
through the payment processor and then the credit card network, to the firm.
The trigger for a refund is a request, made by a purchaser, for return of payment
upon discovery that the software is fake (or not what they expected). The purchaser
may then issue a request for a refund at any point after the sale. To construct a model
of requests, we let s denote the number of sales in a given period and let rq denote the
number of refund requests that result from s. We model requests in period t as a Poisson
random variable:
rqt = λst−1,
where λ captures the expected portion of buyers from period t−1 who will issue a request
for a refund in period t. Given the speed at which information is received and decisions
are made, we are primarily concerned with periods corresponding to individual days.
When a refund request has been made, the firm can either ignore the request or grant
a refund. If the firm ignores the request, then the buyer may contact the credit card
network to obtain a refund. When the credit card network grants a refund to the buyer,
the network must collect the funds from the firm by reversing the charge, hence refunds
of this type are called chargebacks. This pattern is born out in the data as, for each of
the firms under study, the average time to receive a chargeback is substantially longer
than the average time to receive a refund (for AV1, chargebacks average 23.7 days longer
to process than refunds; the comparable numbers for the other firms are 21.4 days for
AV2 and 10.6 days for AV3). For AV1 and AV2, 35-37% of all refunds occur within three
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days of sales. In contrast, only 1-6% of all chargebacks for AV1 and AV2 occur within
three days of sales. For AV3, only 12% of refunds occur within 3 days of sales but less
than 1% of chargebacks occur within that same time.
If the firm ceases operations prior to a collection by the payment processor, then
the processor must absorb the cost of the chargeback. Because a firm with a large
number of sales in a period may decide to cease operations, leaving the processor at risk
of absorbing a large number of chargebacks, the payment processor has an incentive to
identify illegitimate firms and sever ties with them.
To model the interplay of requests, refunds (which are made directly by the firm to the
buyer) and chargebacks, we must specify how payment processors monitor chargebacks
to limit their risk. Let cb be a threshold, above which the credit card company denies
all future transactions. In determining how many requests to refund, a firm that wishes
to continue operations must balance the loss in current revenue from granting refunds
against the loss of future revenue from being denied access to the credit card network.
The number of refunds in a given period, rf , is thus an increasing function of the number
of requests and a decreasing function of the number of chargebacks, cb,
rf = g (rq, cb) .
Let the threshold cb apply to the sum of accumulated chargebacks over T periods.
The decision rule of the credit card network is to sever ties with a firm if
∑t
s=1 cbs > cb,
for any period t ∈ 1, . . . , T . As a consequence, a firm will increase the rate of refunds
as the sum of accumulated chargebacks approaches the threshold cb. That is, refunds
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follow the pattern
rft = α · rqt + β · rqt ·
{
cb−
t∑
s=1
cbs < D
}
, (2.1)
where {A} takes the value 1 if the event A occurs and is 0 otherwise.
The desire to avoid crossing the threshold cb leads to a distinctive pattern of refunds
and chargebacks. For a payment processor, Equation (2.1) provides several patterns
to distinguish these firms from legitimate software providers. For example, refunds from
firms may increase at the periodic interval corresponding to T or may increase in reaction
to an increase in chargebacks. Also, refunds should increase as the cumulated chargeback
sum approaches cb. For legitimate providers, no such dynamic pattern of refunds should
emerge.
To understand the difference in the dynamic refund pattern between legitimate providers
and fraudulent firms, note that in contrast to Equation 2.1, refunds for legitimate providers
follow the pattern
rft = α · rqt (2.2)
Because refunds are not a function of chargebacks in Equation 2.2, refunds should depend
only on requests for legitimate providers.
To provide evidence that a firm’s refunds respond to chargebacks, we display daily
refunds and chargebacks for the firms in Figure 2.5. For each of the firms, surges in daily
chargebacks are closely followed by (or occur simultaneously with) surges in refunds. The
only exceptions appear to be at the latter part of Figure 2.5.
While the figures reveal a dynamic pattern of refunds and chargebacks that is con-
sistent with Equation 2.1, isolating the impact of chargebacks on refunds requires that
we control for the level of sales. We must do so because refunds are positively related
to sales, so it is possible that sustained increases in sales could lead to increases in both
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chargebacks and refunds. To estimate the isolated impact of chargebacks, we construct
the ordinary least squares estimates of the coefficients in
rft = β0 + β1cbt + β2cbt−1 + β3st + ut. (2.3)
The coefficients β1 and β2 capture the increase in refunds on day t brought about by an
increase in chargebacks on day t and day t − 1, holding previous sales constant. The
coefficient β3 captures the increase in refunds due to an increase in average sales over the
past three days (st). As we do not observe the number of refund requests each day, we
use st as a proxy. The quantity ut is a random error that encompasses all other factors
that influence refunds on that day.
Estimates of Equation 2.3 are contained in Table 1. The column labeled (I) corre-
sponds to Equation 2.3 with β2 = 0; that is, lagged chargebacks are not included (these
lagged chargebacks are included in Column II). For each of the firms, chargebacks have
a substantial impact on refunds after controlling for previous sales. For example, the
estimate of 0.64 for firm AV1 indicates that, after controlling for the average level of
sales over the previous 3 days, an increase of 100 chargebacks leads to an increase of 64
refunds. In contrast, an increase in average sales of 100 leads to an increase of only 1
refund. The estimated standard errors describe the precision of our estimates: for this
coefficient on chargebacks, the confidence interval of (0.16,1.12) indicates the range of
plausible values for β1. As the interval does not contain 0, the data is strongly supportive
of a positive relationship between chargebacks and refunds.
In addition to controlling for sales, we also control for date of the month and day of the
week to remove any monthly and daily trends. Column (III) in Table 2.1 corresponds
to the coefficient estimates of Equation 2.3 while controlling for monthly and weekly
patterns. This was possible with AV2 and AV3 but not for AV1 due to limited data.
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Table 2.1: Coefficient estimates for Equation 2.3
AV1 - Refunds (I) (II)
Chargebacks 0.64 0.52
(0.24)* (0.24)*
Lagged Chargebacks - 0.55
(0.21)*
3-day Average Sales 0.008 0.009
(0.008) (0.008)
AV2 - Refunds (I) (II) (III)
Chargebacks 1.23 1.16 1.17
(0.14)* (0.15)* (0.14)*
Lagged Chargebacks - 0.26 0.25
(0.12)* (0.12)*
3-day Average Sales 0.043 0.041 0.041
(0.004)* (0.004)* (0.004)*
AV3 - Refunds (I) (II) (III)
Chargebacks 0.72 0.71 0.72
(0.24)* (0.23)* (0.23)*
Lagged Chargebacks - 0.089 0.088
(0.073) (0.080)
3-day Average Sales 0.031 0.030 0.030
(0.004)* (0.004)* (0.004)*
Note: * indicates significance at the 5% level. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in
parenthesis. Our results are not sensitive to the choice of a 3-day average sales window.
Table 1 indicates significant correlation between chargebacks received and refunds
granted while controlling for previous sales and monthly fluctuations among all three
firms. Without knowing more firm-level details regarding their contracts with payment
processors or restrictions from credit card networks further inference becomes difficult.
However, we do interpret this as evidence that fraudulent firms seem to alter their refunds
according to the chargebacks reported against them. Payment processors or credit card
networks have more information and have a better understanding of the firm’s chargeback
constraints and may, therefore, be in a unique position to monitor these firms.
An important limitation to our analysis is that we lack comparable data for legitimate
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firms. Despite our findings above, we are unable to discern whether or not this pattern
is distinctive to only illegitimate firms.
2.6.2 Detecting Fraudulent Firms
The previously described patterns in behavior could be observed by the payment pro-
cessor since it knows the number of chargebacks against the firm at a particular time, the
chargeback threshold faced by the firm, as well as the number of refunds the firm is offer-
ing (as these would have to pass through the payment processor). If the payment proces-
sor has an incentive to investigate its clients, the existence of this chargeback-responsive
behavior could provide evidence that a particular antivirus company is fraudulent. The
question is: Does the payment processor have an incentive to investigate its clients?
The payment processor (as noted in Section 2.4.3) receives a percentage of each
transaction that occurs but faces a risk of losing business with a credit card company for
too much fraudulent behavior. While losing a major credit card company like Visa would
devastate a payment processor (as in the case of ePassporte), the credit card company
may be hesitant to drop a payment processor if it does enough legitimate business (as in
the case of Chronopay).
However, at any given time there is a risk that the fraudulent antivirus firm may
be caught or may cease operations. In this case the firm will no longer be able to offer
refunds and the payment processor will receive an increase in chargebacks from consumers
who have no other way of receiving a refund. The payment processor would be forced to
pay the entire amount of the chargeback (the chargeback fees as well as the entire refund
amount) as it can no longer bill the firm. Depending on the volume of sales, the risk of
future increases in chargebacks could be very costly. If this risk outweighs the revenue
the payment processor receives from the firm’s account, it may prefer to sever ties with
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the firm as to not be held liable for the potential chargebacks.
In the case when the firm is caught, credit card companies would have to pay the
costs of the chargebacks if the payment processor is forced to shut down. The credit
card companies may, therefore, be concerned if a small payment processor is serving an
illegitimate firm that may be relatively large compared to the processor’s overall volume.
In these cases, credit card companies may have an incentive to investigate these firms if
they are working with small payment processors. While the credit card company may
not observe as much firm level information as the payment processor, it observes the
chargebacks and refunds associated with a particular firm. Therefore, this could be a
good technique for a credit card company to investigate fraudulent firms.
As mentioned above, we expect the rate of refunds offered by a fraudulent firm to vary
in response to chargebacks incurred by the firm. As firms increase their sales, payment
processors and credit card networks face increased risk of liability for future chargebacks
if the firm ceases operations. This risk may warrant investigation of fraudulent firms
using these observable patterns.
2.7 Ethical Considerations
The nature of the data that we collected raises a number of ethical concerns. In
particular, we have a large amount of personal information for the victims who were
defrauded by these three fake AV businesses. Thus, we took measures to protect the pri-
vacy and identity of the victims through the use of data encryption, automated program
analysis, and by conducting our research according to established ethical principles in
the field (Burstein, 2008; Dittrich et al., 2009; Garfinkel, 2008; Kenneally et al., 2010).
We also obtained approval from the Institutional Review Board (IRB) at the University
of California, Santa Barbara before performing our analysis. Finally, we provided all
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information that we obtained to U.S. law enforcement officials.
2.8 Related Work
In the past few years, there have been several studies that have analyzed various
aspects of fraudulent businesses selling fake antivirus products. Researchers from Google
described the techniques and dynamics used by cybercriminals to drive traffic to their
sites via landing pages (Rajab et al., 2010). Other work analyzed the distribution and
installation methods of rogue security software (Fossi et al., 2009). Various security ven-
dors have reported on potential revenue from scareware operations based on the number
of infections that they observed (Correll and Corrons, 2010; Micro, 2009). Cova et al.
(2010) presented an analysis of the rogue antivirus structure and indirectly tried to mea-
sure the number of victims and profits based on poorly configured web servers used by
several fake AV groups. They estimated the conversion rate of infections to sales at
1.36%, which is slightly lower than the rates that we observed. We also found a simi-
lar geographic distribution of victims in the U.S., and number of domains registered by
larger fake AV groups. In comparison, our data provides a much more complete view of
large-scale fake AV operations, with information dating back more than two years. We
also had visibility of refunds and chargebacks from fake AV sales, which has never been
studied before.
Techniques to identify drive-by-download attacks have been proposed that analyze
web sites for malicious content in a virtual or emulated environment to detect exploits
(Cova et al., 2010; Ikinci et al., 2008). The prevalence of malicious web sites has been ex-
amined through crawler-based approaches that analyzed billions of web pages (Mavrom-
matis and Monrose, 2008; Provos et al., 2007). Another study analyzed drive-by attacks
via infiltration and provided insights into the compromised web servers used in the attacks
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as well as the security posture of potential victims (Stone-Gross et al., 2011a).
A number of recent papers have analyzed the reasons that cause users to fall victim to
phishing scams, which include lack of knowledge and attentiveness to browser and other
security related cues (Dhamija et al., 2006; Egelman et al., 2008). Several approaches
have been proposed to detect phishing sites such as analyzing page content, layout,
and other anomalies (Ludl et al., 2007; Pan and Ding, 2006; Rosiello et al., 2007). In
addition, studies have analyzed the modus operandi of the criminal operations behind
phishing (McGrath and Gupta, 2008), and the effectiveness of phishing defenses (Moore
and Clayton, 2007).
Previous work has investigated the Internet’s underground economy, through adver-
tised prices of web forums (Zhuge et al., 2009) and IRC chat rooms (Franklin et al., 2007).
Holz et al. (2009) studied the drop zones used by botnets to store stolen information from
victims. Stone-Gross et al. (2009a) hijacked the Torpig botnet and studied the data ex-
filtrated from infected computers, and estimated the value of the compromised financial
information (e.g., credit card numbers and bank account credentials). The underground
economy of large-scale spam operations was examined in (Stone-Gross et al., 2011b).
The paper analyzed the complexity in orchestrating spam campaigns, and explored an
underground forum used by spammers to exchange goods and services. Another type of
scam, known as One Click Fraud, was studied by Christin et al. (2010). The fraud works
through intimidation (similar to fake AV) by threatening unsuspecting web site visitors
with potential embarrassment (e.g., the victim was browsing pornographic content) un-
less a payment is received for a nonexistent service. The authors presented an economic
model to determine the number of users that must fall victim to the scam in order to
remain economically viable, and estimated losses in the tens to hundreds of thousands of
U.S. dollars.
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2.9 Conclusions
In this paper, we have presented an in-depth study of how a particular type of scare-
ware, namely fake anti-virus software, is deployed and managed. Our work is unique in
that it is based on the information contained on a number of key servers that were part
of the criminals’ infrastructure. This unprecedented access allowed us to obtain ground
truth about the type and sophistication of the techniques used to lure victims into paying
for scareware, as well as the amount of transactions performed, including refunds and
chargebacks.
We leveraged this data to build an economic model that shows how cybercriminals
are very careful in performing refunds and chargebacks in order to maintain a balanced
financial posture that does not immediately reveal their criminal nature. Nonetheless,
the economic model also outlines how these operations have distinct characteristics that
may differentiate these criminal endeavors from legitimate business operations.
Future work will extend the current model with detection capabilities that can be
directly applied to payment data streams. The goal is to develop a tool based on the
model that can identify scareware operations automatically.
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Figure 2.5: Daily refunds and chargebacks from fake AV sales.
The dashed line displays the number of refunds per day, while the solid line displays the number of
chargebacks per day.
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Chapter 3
Deforestation in Malawi: The Role
of Agricultural Subsidies and Ethnic
Favoritism
3.1 Introduction
More than one third of the rural population in developing countries is located on land
with limited potential for agriculture (Barbier and Hochard, 2014). Programs aimed to
improve food security and reduce poverty have attempted to improve land productivity
through various means, yet the environmental consequences of such programs are am-
biguous ex ante. Improvement of land productivity may increase the marginal return
to clearing forest land for agriculture and thus increase deforestation. However, in a
setting of subsistence farming on unproductive land, increased agricultural productivity
may reduce or delay the need to shift cultivation, thus slowing deforestation.
Understanding the impact of increased land productivity on deforestation is an em-
pirical challenge, as it requires spatial and temporal variation in the availability of input
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subsidies that are not strictly correlated with existing agricultural practices. In this pa-
per, we overcome this obstacle by examining the case of a large-scale fertilizer subsidy
program in Malawi and leveraging ethnic favoritism in government resource allocation.
Exploiting a change in the ethnicity of the Malawi president following the 2004 election,
we demonstrate that coethnic households are 10 - 12% more likely to have access to
fertilizer subsidies than households of a different ethnicity. Local jurisdictions with ma-
jority or plurality populations of the same ethnicity as the president experience much less
deforestation than others. Using district-level data on the quantity of fertilizer subsidies,
we estimate the elasticity of deforestation with respect to fertilizer subsidies and find
it to be consistently negative. Estimates instrumenting the provision of fertilizer subsi-
dies with the coethnic relationship yield elasticities with larger magnitudes in nearly all
specifications.
Our results suggest there exist significant environmental spillovers from development
policies. Limiting deforestation has been a goal of development agencies for a number
of years and has garnered increased interest as global climate change has become more
salient. The United Nation‘s Millennium Development Goals stress the importance of
slowing deforestation, especially in the developing world. One challenge to aid agencies
and governments alike is that measures to slow deforestation are often seen to be at odds
with poverty alleviation. Policies that can improve incomes and slow deforestation offer
a coveted ’win-win’ path to achieving these important ends.
The existing literature examining the effects of development policies, agricultural
subsidies and input subsidies on deforestation have yielded mixed results. Some smaller
case studies, such as Chibwana et al. (2012), have found that input subsidies, including
fertilizer provision, can in fact slow deforestation by incentivizing farmers to switch from
slash-and-burn agriculture to more intensive crops. Bulte et al. (2007) study agricul-
tural subsidies in Latin America and argue that these subsidies encourage landowners to
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put more land into agriculture, thus increasing deforestation. Alix-Garcia et al. (2013)
find evidence that poverty alleviation may exacerbate deforestation by increasing local
demand for products that require the clearing of land.
Our paper differs from Bulte et al. (2007) and Alix-Garcia et al. (2013) in that it ex-
amines targeted input subsidies rather than acerage-based subsidies or income transfers.
The setting also differs as Malawi (similar to much of sub-Saharan Africa) suffers from
low land productivity in agriculture and the majority of those working in agriculture
are subsistence-level farmers. Therefore, targeted input subsidies have real potential to
improve yields and slow deforestation from shifting cultivation in Africa.
Our paper also relates to the existing literature on ethnic favoritism and resource
allocation. While other papers are discussed below, Morjaria (2014) studies deforestation
in Kenya during the democratic transition and finds districts of the same ethnicity as the
president experience more deforestation relative to others. The mechanism in his paper is
the allocation of permits to clear forested land, which explains the opposite relationship
of deforestation and ethnic alignment with the president than that which we find in our
paper.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 provides important background on Malawi,
including a discussion on the role ethnicity plays in resource allocation, the fertilizer
subsidy program as well as agriculture and deforestation in this setting. In Section
3.3 we provide empirical evidence for our story. We demonstrate that land quality is
negatively related to deforestation, that households ethnically aligned with the president
are significantly more likely to receive fertilizer subsidies and that districts aligned with
the president receive larger quantities. We demonstrate ethnic alignment of traditional
authorities (a local jurisdictional unit) is negatively correlated with deforestation and
we estimate district-level elasticities of deforestation and fertilizer subsidies via both
ordinary-least-squares and instrumental variables and find them to be negative. Section
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3.4 concludes with final remarks.
3.2 Ethnic favoritism, Deforestation and Fertilizer
Subsidies in Malawi
Malawi is an extremely ethnically diverse nation, comprised of 9 major tribal groups:
Chewa, Lomwe, Yao, Ngoni, Tumbuka, Nyanja, Sena, Tonga and Ngonde. The three
dominant ethnic groups (Chewa, Lomwe and the Yao) account for approximately two-
thirds of Malawi’s total population (See Figure 3.1). Each group has their own language
and traditions which continue to play an important role in Malawian society and politics.
Existing geographic concentrations of ethnic groups prior to the drawing of national
borders largely explain the spatial distribution of ethnicity observed today. Figure 3.2
presents the the dominant ethnic group in each traditional authority throughout Malawi.
The fact that there are few dominant ethnic groups has led to tensions within the
political system. Posner (2004) finds ethnic tensions among the Tumbuka and Chewa
much stronger in Malawi than in Zambia, where there are more than seventy ethnic
groups, due to the greater relative political presence of these groups in Malawi. There
is also limited trust of individuals from other ethnicities in Malawi. Robinson (2013)
finds that ethnic divisions in Malawi also lead to economic fragmentation and limit
price dispersion, arguing that many of the markets are trust-oriented. Given the strong
role ethnic group identity plays in markets and politics, Malawi is susceptible to ethnic
favoritism in public good provision.
Kramon and Posner (2013) study the role of ethnic favoritism throughout Africa and,
while findings vary from country to country, they find evidence that, in Malawi, those
sharing the ethnicity of the president in power benefit from improved infant care and
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Figure 3.1: Share of ethnic groups in Malawi by population
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educational opportunities. Furthermore, in a new working paper, Ejdemyr et al. (2015)
examine ethnic favoritism and targeting of distributive goods in Malawi. In their cross-
sectional data, the authors find that there is a significant correlation between receiving a
subsidy and ethnic alignment with the local politician. Additionally, the results suggest
that local politicians in areas with more segregation are able to target their co-ethnics
with public goods while politicians in less segregated areas rely on the use of subsidies,
or private goods, to reward co-ethnics.
In this paper, we exploit the 2004 election in which the country saw a change in the
ethnicity of the president from Bakili Muluzi, a member of the Yao tribe, to Bingu wa
Mutharika, a member of the Lomwe tribe.1 The Yao and Lomwe ethnic groups are both
concentrated in Southeast Malawi and hold roughly equal population shares in the coun-
1This is the same change used by Kramon and Posner (2013) to study ethnic favoritism.
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Figure 3.2: Traditional Authorities by Largest Ethnic Group
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try.2 In 2004, the Yao tribe lost a connection to the presidency, while the Lomwe gained
it. We argue that this change led to important differences in the allocation of fertilizer
subsidies, as this resource was targeted to coethnics and withheld from opposition ethnic
groups.
3.2.1 Fertilizer and Seed Subsidies in Malawi
Malawi has historically been vulnerable to food insecurity due to its population den-
sity, limited access to resources and dependence on an agricultural sector centered on
rainfed maize. To help increase food security, the government introduced a fertilizer
subsidy program during the 1999/2000 season called the Starter Pack that targeted 2.8
million farm households, providing them enough seeds and fertilizer to cultivate about
0.1 hectares of their staple crop maize (Pauw and Thurlow, 2014). Cost concerns forced
the government to revamp the program the next year and, under the new name Targeted
Input Program (TIP), they cut the number of beneficiaries in half.
Following a food crisis in 2001/2002, the government again increased access to the
subsidy program. The current program, the Farm Input Subsidy Program (FISP), was
established during the 2005/2006 agricultural season and targets 1.5 million smallholder
farmers throughout Malawi (Pauw and Thurlow, 2014). The Malawi agricultural subsidy
program is one of the most important subsidy programs in Sub-Saharan Africa and
provides an opportunity to explore the impacts of increased fertilizer and seed access on
deforestation both because of its size and also its allocation.
Allocation of the fertilizer subsidies, distributed as vouchers, has always lacked trans-
parency. While a targeted program, there was no defined criteria for defining which
households qualified until 2007/2008.3 The disbursement of fertilizer vouchers is central-
2See Figures 3.1 and 3.2.
3According to Dorward et al. (2008) prior to 2007/2008, eligible households were those who could not
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ized with the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security, a position held by the president,
allocating vouchers to the district-level and, in some seasons, allocating them at a locality-
level. Westberg et al. (2015), in a recent working paper, finds evidence of a politically
motivated allocation of vouchers whereby they are directed towards swing voters and
coethnic districts and away from those of the opposition prior to the 2009 election.4
3.2.2 Deforestation in Malawi
Deforestation in Malawi, where the majority of the population are subsistence farmers,
is caused by slash and burn agricultural techniques. Malawi farmers face declining soil
arability due to farming techniques and low land productivity and therefore slash and
burn forested land to access more fertile soil. This agricultural practice has resulted in
increased levels of deforestation in Malawi compared to the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa
(UNFAO, 2010).
Economic models of shifting cultivation, such as Balsdon (2007), predict that improv-
ing soil quality and/or land productivity can increase the time a given field is cultivated
before shifting to another. In this context, fertilizer should slow deforestation. However,
economic models of land clearing for agriculture, such as Angelsen (1999) - among many
others, predict that increasing the returns to agriculture should also increase the amount
of land cleared for that purpose. These models would predict increased deforestation as
a result of fertilizer subsidies. The effect of these subsidies on deforestation remains an
empirical question.
There are a few papers that have found that agricultural subsidies lead to decreases
in deforestation, but they are mostly small case studies. The article most relevant to
the Malawi setting, Chibwana et al. (2012), finds that agricultural households in Malawi
afford one or two bags of fertilizer at current market prices and this was determined by local leaders.
4Due to strong ethnic identity and political overlap, the opposition districts are largely of the Yao
ethnicity.
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that received agricultural subsidies through FISP cleared less forest when compared to
households that did not receive a subsidy. While this is only a small case study (N=380)
that covers two districts (Kasunga and Machinga), the finding suggests that Malawian
farmers moved away from slash and burn agriculture and focus on crop intensification of
maize.
3.3 Empirical Analysis
As discussed above, the relationship between agricultural input subsidies and defor-
estation is theoretically ambiguous and depends on the constraints faced by the agricul-
tural households of interest. Therefore, development programs, such as fertilizer subsi-
dies, designed to improve agricultural productivity could increase or decrease levels of
deforestation by raising the marginal productivity of agricultural land. Deforestation
would increase if the fertilizer subsidies increased the demand for land clearing through
increased productivity. However, in Malawi, where most farmers are subsistence farm-
ing on unproductive land, increasing agricultural productivity through fertilizer subsidies
may reduce the need to shift cultivation to maintain the desired yields resulting in de-
creased levels of deforestation. Using data on subsidies, deforestation and ethnicity, we
can empirically estimate the underlying relationship between fertilizer subsidies and levels
of deforestation.
3.3.1 Soil Quality
The theory that increased productivity of agricultural land lowers deforestation as-
sumes that, in our setting, agricultural households clear less land when their soil quality
is higher. Agricultural inputs, such as fertilizer, play an important role in the overall
productivity and quality of soil. The correct use of fertilizer has been shown to both
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increase yields and improve overall soil quality. Therefore, if our above assumption holds
true, we would expect areas with lower soil quality to have higher levels of deforestation
and areas with increased access to agricultural inputs to have lower levels of deforesta-
tion. We can test the first hypothesis about soil quality and deforestation by comparing
levels of deforestation across areas with varying soil quality in Malawi.
The data for this analysis comes from two different sources. The first dataset is
compiled by the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) constraints
index. The index measures soil quality on a scale from 1-7, where 1 represents high
levels of soil quality and 7 represents soil unsuitable for agriculture. We assign a score
to each Traditional Authority (TA) in Malawi by taking the area weighted average of
soil quality within the TA. The second data set is the deforestation data that comes
from recently released data from researchers at the University of Maryland that provides
estimates of forest cover for the entire terrestrial surface of the earth at a 30m×30m
resolution (Hansen et al., 2013). Included in the dataset are estimates of the percentage
of each 30m×30m grid cell in forest cover in the year 2000.5 The dataset also provides
annual indicators from 2001 to 2012 denoting that a grid cell containing nonzero tree
cover in 2000 is estimated to have fallen to zero percent tree cover. For our deforestation
measure, we limit the sample to cells that had at least 30% forest cover at baseline to
reduce the noise in our deforestation measure. From those cells, we count the number of
pixels deforested in each year within each traditional authority, thus creating a panel of
annual deforestation at the traditional authority level from 2001-2012.6
To test the assumption that more deforestation occurs in areas with lower soil quality
5Forest cover is defined as area covered by vegetation greater than 5 meters in height.
6It should be noted that this definition of deforestation is not universally accepted. Tropek et al.
(2014) point out that classifying forest as vegetation taller than 5 meters can lead to classification of
different plantations as forest. Harvesting of these plantations may result in observed deforestation when,
in reality, the land had been cleared and planted prior to the beginning of the study period.
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we estimate the following equation:
yid = β0 + β1Soilid + β3Xi + γd + εid (3.1)
where yid is the average level of deforestation measured in traditional authority i in
district d from 2001 to 2012. Soilid is an index of soil quality measured at the traditional
authority level, Xi are additional cross sectional controls at the traditional authority
level, including population, population growth, electrification, average household size,
fuel wood use, and percent of the population participating in agriculture, γd is a district
fixed effect, and εid is the traditional authority error term.
Table 3.1 shows the regression results of soil quality on deforestation. Columns (1)
through (3) use the level of deforestation as the outcome variable (as measured in number
of pixels) and the results provide evidence that lower soil quality leads to significantly
higher levels of deforestation. The significant and positive estimates can be interpreted
as an increase in the number of soil constraints constraints to agriculture (or a decrease in
soil quality) at the traditional authority level is correlated with higher levels of deforesta-
tion. The result holds up to the addition district fixed effects, but becomes insignificant
with the addition of cross-sectional control variables. Instead using the natural log of
deforestation as the outcome variable, the results in columns (4) through (6) again show
that lower levels of soil quality are correlated with increased deforestation and this time
the result is robust to the inclusion of year fixed effects, as well as additional controls.
The results in Table 1 support the assumption that deforestation and agricultural pro-
ductivity are negatively correlated in the case under study. Throughout our analysis, we
prefer the log of deforestation as the outcome variable because it accounts for different
levels of forest cover at baseline and also provides intuitive interpretations of regression
coefficients.
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Table 3.1: Soil Quality and Deforestation 2001-2012
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mean Deforestation Pixels Log of Mean Deforestation
Soil Constraints 155.2*** 209.7** 130.2 0.424*** 0.582*** 0.259**
(40.09) (93.91) (80.33) (0.107) (0.169) (0.117)
District FE NO YES YES NO YES YES
Controls NO NO YES NO NO YES
Observations 223 223 223 223 223 223
R-squared 0.020 0.386 0.434 0.067 0.509 0.745
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
3.3.2 Ethnic Favoritism and Fertilizer Subsidies
In order to identify the effect of fertilizer subsidies on deforestation in Malawi, we
need to overcome the endogeneity of subsidy allocations. If all households growing the
same crop with the same technology received the same amount of fertilizer subsidies at
the same time, it would be difficult to empirically disentangle the effect of the subsidies
on deforestation from other systematic changes such as variation in market price of maize,
technology adoption, etc. Furthermore, if fertilizer subsidies were allocated based on some
unobservable criteria that also effects the demand or cost of clearing forest (for example
more productive households are able to get the subsidy easier than less productive ones)
simple estimates of the relationship between subsidies and deforestation will be biased.
To overcome this problem, we need a time-varying allocation criteria that is orthogonal
to changes in unobservable criteria mentioned above.
We use a similar strategy as Kramon and Posner (2013), exploiting both the role of
ethnic favoritism in government resource allocation and the change in the ethnicity of
the Malawi president following the 2004 election. If there exist two households identical
but for their ethnicity and the outcome of the 2004 election leads to the alignment
90
Deforestation in Malawi: The Role of Agricultural Subsidies and Ethnic Favoritism Chapter 3
in ethnicity of one household but not the other, in the presence of ethnic favoritism
in subsidy allocation, this change will allow us to estimate the relationship between
fertilizer subsidies and deforestation. For this to be a valid strategy, we need to show
that coethnics before the election, members of or districts aligned with the Yao tribe,
received more fertilizer subsidies compared to members of or districts aligned with other
tribes prior to the 2004 election. Additionally, we need to show that coethnics after the
election, members of or districts aligned with the Lomwe tribe, received more fertilizer
subsidies compared to members of or districts aligned with other tribes following the
2004 election.
The data we use for this analysis comes from multiple sources. The first dataset
contains information on use of agricultural subsidies at the household level and comes
from two waves of the Malawi Integrated Household Survey (IHS). The IHS is part of the
Living Standards Measurement Study (LSMS), which is a household survey program,
run by the World Bank’s Development Research Group, in partnership with national
statistical offices (NSOs). The IHS waves in Malawi collected information on poverty
and income equality, demographic characteristics, health, education, and agriculture.
The IHS data used in the analysis comes from the IHS second and third waves for which
data was collected in 2004 and 2010. The surveys collected information from a nationally
representative sample. The sampling design is representative at both national and district
level. The surveys ask households about agricultural subsidies received during the years
2001, 2002, 2003 and 2009. Additionally, they ask about the tribal language spoken
within the household, which allows for the creation of a short household pseudo-panel
with household characteristics, household ethnicity and an indicator variable for whether
the household received an agricultural subsidy in a given year. Finally, indicator variables
are created for both Yao and Lomwe households, as well as when a household is ethnically
aligned with the president in power.
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The second source of fertilizer data was provided by the International Food Policy
Research Institute (IFPRI) and contains data on fertilizer subsidy allocations by district
and year for 2001 through 2012 with the exception of 2006. The data reports the amount
of fertilizer subsidies distributed to each district in kilograms. There are 24 districts over
11 years, which results in 264 observations for this part of the analysis.
The last dataset is the 2008 Malawi Census.7 The census surveyed 298,607 households
and 1,343,078 individuals (10% of the total population) and the ethnicity question allows
us to measure tribal populations at the traditional authority level. Figure 3.3 illustrates
the tribal distribution found in the Malawi census. Additionally, we create variables
identifying traditional authorities and districts by the share of the population that belong
to the Yao tribe, the share of the population that belong to the Lomwe tribe, the tribe
that has a plurality, meaning that the tribe that makes up the largest proportion of
the population, and the tribe that has a majority, meaning that the tribe that makes
up over 50% of the population. Figures 3.2 and 3.3 show the ethnic plurality of each
traditional authority and the share of population belonging to the Yao tribe and Lomwe
tribe respectively. These maps lay out the spatial variation in ethnicity, which we rely
on for identification.
Using the psudeo-panel created by combining the IHS surveys, we can estimate the
following model to test for ethnic favoritism in the allocation of fertilizer subsidies at the
household level:
yjdt = β0 + β1Alignedjdt + γd + φt + εjdt (3.2)
where yjdt is an indicator for whether household j in district d received an agricultural
subsidy in year t. Alignedjdt is an indicator for whether a household is ethnically aligned
7We accessed the 2008 Malawi Census data via IPUMS.
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Figure 3.3: Traditional Authority Share of Ethnicity
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with the president (Yao before 2004 and Lomwe after 2004), γj is a district fixed effect,
φt is a year fixed effect and, finally, εjdt is the household-year error term.
The coefficient of interest is β1. If ethnic alignment influences subsidy allocation,
then we would expect β1 to be strictly positive. The results in Table 3.2 columns (1)
to (3) show that ethnic alignment with the president leads to a significant increase in
the probability of receiving a fertilizer subsidy by between 10 and 13 percentage points.
The result is robust to the addition of year fixed effects and district fixed effects. This
analysis suggests that ethnic favoritism does indeed impact government allocations of
fertilizer subsidies at the household level.
Additionally, we can explore the same question about ethnic favoritism and fertilizer
subsidies using indicators for Yao households, Lomwe households, Post-2004, and the
interactions between them. We estimate the following model:
yjdt = β0+β1Y aojd+β2Lomwejd+β3Postt+β4Y aojd×Postt+β4Lomwejd×Postt+γd+εjdt
(3.3)
where yjdt is as noted above, Y aojd is an indicator for whether a household belongs to
the Yao tribe (the president‘s tribe before the 2004 election), Lomwejd is an indicator
for whether a household belongs to the Lomwe tribe (the president‘s tribe after the 2004
election), Postt is an indicator for after the election (this variable is dropped when year
fixed effects are included), γd is a district fixed effect and εjdt is the household-year error
term. The omitted reference group is all households of an ethnicity other than Yao or
Lomwe.
The results from estimating the above equation are reported in Table 3.2 columns (4)
through (6). Again, we can see that ethnic alignment with the president prior to the 2004
election led to an increase in the probability of receiving a fertilizer subsidy by between
13 and 14 percentage points for Yao households. Furthermore, Lomwe households had
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the same probability of receiving a subsidy as other ethnicities prior to 2004, but had
an increase probability of receiving a subsidy between 7 and 11 percentage points after
2004. These results are robust to the addition of year fixed effects and district fixed
effects. Additionally, Figure 3.4 provides a graphical presentation of ethnic favoritism in
the allocation of fertilizer subsidies at the household level. The graph shows the share
of surveyed households receiving a fertilizer subsidy by ethnicity and is consistent with
Yao households receiving more subsidies prior to 2004 and Lomwe households receiving
more subsidies following the 2004 election. These results provide evidence that ethnic
favoritism plays a role in household-level fertilizer allocation.
Figure 3.4: Share of surveyed households receiving fertilizer subsidies by ethnicity
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The above results on ethnic favoritism and the allocation of fertilizer subsidies at the
household level are useful to demonstrate the relationship between the two, however, we
do not observe deforestation at the household level. Therefore, we need to use aggregated
data of fertilizer subsidies and show that ethnic favoritism also plays a role in how fertilizer
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subsidies are allocated at the district level.8 We estimate the following equation using the
IFPRI fertilizer subsidy data and the Malawi Census data to examine the relationship
between district alignment and fertilizer subsidies:
ydt = β0 +β1Y aod+β2Lomwed+β3Postt+β4Y aod×Postt+β5Lomwed×Postt+γd+εdt
(3.4)
where ydt is amount of fertilizer subsidy allocated at the district and year level, Y aod is an
indicator for whether a district‘s ethnic majority is the Yao tribe, Lomwed is an indicator
for whether a district‘s ethnic majority is the Lomwe tribe, Postt is an indicator for after
the election (this variable is dropped when year fixed effects are included), γd is a district
fixed effect, φt is a year fixed effect and, finally, εdt is the district-year error term. The
omitted reference group is all districts of an ethnicity other than Yao or Lomwe.
Table 3.3 clearly shows that the districts where the majority of the population are
members of the Yao tribe or Lomwe tribe received significantly more fertilizer subsidies
compared to other districts prior to the 2004 election. Following the election, we can
see that the Yao districts‘ fertilizer allocations dropped significantly compared to both
the Lomwe districts and other districts.9 These effects are robust to the addition of year
fixed effects and district fixed effects. This result again provides evidence that ethnic
favoritism plays an important role in how fertilizer subsidies are allocated in Malawi.
Moreover, it seems that the impacts are driven by the significant decrease in fertilizer
allocations to Yao districts following the 2004 election.
8While we are able to estimate deforestation at the traditional authority level, we only have data on
the quantity of fertilizer distributed to the districts, so we must use this level of aggregation.
9The sum of the coefficient on Y ao and the coefficient on Y ao × Post are effectively zero, which
indicates that the Yao group benefitted from additional subsidies prior to the election, but returned to
levels comparable to other ethnic groups after the election.
97
Deforestation in Malawi: The Role of Agricultural Subsidies and Ethnic Favoritism Chapter 3
Table 3.3: Quantity of Fertilizer by Ethnic Majority of District
(1) (2) (3)
Lomwe District 0.493*** 0.493*** 1.143***
(0.131) (0.111) (0.155)
Lomwe x Post 2004 -0.133 -0.133 -0.133
(0.285) (0.177) (0.120)
Yao District 0.890*** 0.890*** 1.607***
(0.159) (0.0911) (0.137)
Yao x Post 2004 -0.250 -0.250*** -0.250***
(0.35) (0.146) (0.116)
Post 2004 1.893*** - -
(0.138) - -
Year FE NO YES YES
District FE NO NO YES
Observations 264 264 264
R-squared 0.419 0.616 0.853
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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3.3.3 Ethnic Alignment and Deforestation
While there seems to be a clear connection between ethnic favoritism and fertilizer
subsidy allocations at both the household level and district level, the impacts on defor-
estation are still ambiguous. Using the panel data on deforestation and the census data
on tribal plurality, tribal majority and ethnic share aligned with the president, we can
examine the direct impacts of ethnic alignment on deforestation. As we do not observe
fertilizer allocation at the traditional authority level, we cannot verify that the mecha-
nism through which deforestation is affected is the fertilizer subsidies. We examine this
explicitly in the next section at the district level, but we have more statistical power at
the traditional authority level as we have many more observations. The empirical model
we use employs a difference-in-differences strategy to identify the impacts. In order to
do this, we construct three different measures of ethnic alignment at the traditional au-
thority level. The first two are indicators for ethnic majority and plurality. Prior to
2004, traditional authorities with a majority or plurality of the population in the Yao
tribe receive a one and all others a zero. Following 2004, traditional authorities with a
majority or plurality of the population in the Lomwe tribe receive a 1one and all others
a zero. The third measure uses the share aligned with the president in each traditional
authority. We interact a pre-2004 indicator with the share of Yao in each traditional
authority and interact a post-2004 indicator with the share of Lomwe in each traditional
authority. Figures Figures 3.2 and 3.3 show the geographical variation of the alignment
variables.
We estimate the following regression model to examine the direct effects of ethnic
alignment with the president on deforestation:
yidt = β0 + β1Alignedidt + β2Xid + γd + φt + εidt (3.5)
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where yidt is the level or natural log of deforestation in traditional authority i in district
d and year t. Alignedidt is one of the three measures of alignment with the president
discussed previously, Xid are additional controls for population and population growth,
γj is a district fixed effect, φt is a year fixed effect and finally εidt is the traditional
authority-year error term.
The parameter of interest is β1, which is similar to a difference-in-difference estimator,
because it compares the levels of deforestation of an aligned tribe‘s traditional author-
ities during periods when they are aligned with the president and when they are not.
Therefore, the main threat to identification would be if the new president used his power
to target areas of the previous president‘s tribe for deforestation. Given the fertilizer
results, there doesn’t seem to be any evidence that the new president punished members
of the Yao tribe through fertilizer allocations. Moreover, this punishment mechanism is
most likely not the case, as the transition following the 2004 election was peaceful and
the previous and new presidents were members of the same political party.
The estimation results are displayed in Table 3.4. The top panel uses the level of
deforestation as the outcome variable and the bottom panel uses the natural log of
deforestation as the outcome variable, which provides more intuitive interpretations of
the coefficients. Columns (1) and (2) use the tribal ethnic majority at the traditional
authority level to measure alignment. Column (2) also includes a district level fixed effect.
Columns (3) and (4) use the tribal ethnic plurality at the traditional authority level to
measure alignment. Column (4) also includes a district level fixed effect. Finally, columns
(5) and (6) use the share of the ethnically aligned tribe at the traditional authority level
to measure alignment. Column (6) also includes a district level fixed effect.
The estimates indicate that traditional authorities with higher populations of co-
ethnics aligned with the president experienced significantly less deforestation compared
to traditional authorities not aligned with the president. Normalizing the level effects
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Table 3.4: Ethnic Alignment and Deforestation in Traditional Authorities
Defor Pixels (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Maj Eth Align -344.2*** -95.93*
(54.10) (53.98)
Plur Eth Align -393.8*** -89.02**
(44.74) (39.22)
Share Aligned -854.8*** -187.1*
(99.45) (101.4)
Year FEs YES YES YES YES YES YES
District FEs NO YES NO YES NO YES
Observations 2,676 2,676 2,676 2,676 2,676 2,676
R-squared 0.058 0.307 0.061 0.307 0.068 0.307
Log of Defor (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Maj Eth Align -0.130 -0.0577
(0.107) (0.113)
Plur Eth Align -0.777*** -0.218**
(0.0904) (0.0944)
Share Aligned -1.482*** -0.616***
(0.165) (0.187)
Year FEs YES YES YES YES YES YES
District FEs NO YES NO YES NO YES
Observations 2,676 2,676 2,676 2,676 2,676 2,676
R-squared 0.183 0.567 0.199 0.568 0.205 0.569
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.5: Deforestation by Ethnicity of Traditional Authority
(1) (2)
Majority Yao -196.7
(191.2)
Majority Yao x Post 2004 51.16
(120.1)
Majority Lomwe -28.52
(59.92)
Majority Lomwe x Post 2004 -67.55
(84.72)
Plurality Yao -165.8
(133.9)
Plurality Yao x Post 2004 -2.198
(108.5)
Plurality Lomwe -54.53
(61.26)
Plurality Lomwe x Post 2004 -132.8*
(76.75)
Post 2004 178.7*** 200.6***
(60.13) (68.52)
Year FEs NO NO
District FEs YES YES
Observations 2,676 2,676
R-squared 0.260 0.260
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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to hectares, we find that alignment with the president leads to between 8 and 75 fewer
hectares being deforested. These effects make sense given that the agricultural subsidy
provided to households by the government provides enough seed and fertilizer to farm
0.1 hectares. The bottom panel shows that ethnic alignment with the president decreases
deforestation by 28% to 78%. These significant effects across specifications suggests that
there is relationship of ethnic alignment on deforestation. However, ethnic alignment
in the Malawi context leads to lower levels of deforestation, which goes against the
hypothesis that politicians use deforestation as a good to reward co-ethnics or political
allies (see Barbier et al. (2005) and Morjaria (2014)).
3.3.4 Fertilizer Subsidies and Deforestation
In order to estimate the effect of fertilizer subsidies on deforestation, we can use ethnic
alignment with the president as an instrument. Using two-stage least-squares estimation,
we estimate the impact of fertilizer subsidies on deforestation using the variation in fertil-
izer subsidy allocation attributable to ethnic favoritism. We aggregate both deforestation
data as well as ethnicity data to the district level given our constraints on fertilizer data.
We then estimate the following two-stage least-squares model where the first stage is:
Fertdt = β0 + β1Aligneddt + β3Xd + φt + εdt (3.6)
and the second stage is:
ydt = α0 + α1 ˆFertdt + α3Xd + φt + dt (3.7)
where Fertdt is the natural log of fertilizer measured at the district-year level, Aligneddt
is one of the three measures of alignment with the president discussed above, Xd are
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additional controls for population and population growth, φt is a year fixed effect, ydt is
the natural log of deforestation measured at the district and year level, and finally εdt
and dt are the district-year error terms.
Using the variation in fertilizer allocations attributable to ethnic favoritism allows
for estimates of α1 that are not confounded by time-invariant unobservable differences
in agriculture or otherwise at the district-level. However, our instrument is invalid if
alignment with the president also yields non-fertilizer related benefits that could impact
forest clearing. For example, if other income transfers allow farmers to work less or
increased public sector employment offered to coethnics incentivizes some to leave farming
altogether, ethnic alignment would have an effect on deforestation other than through
the channel of increased fertilizer subsidies. We believe these concerns are minimal for
two reasons. First, the main source of employment in Malawi is overwhelmingly in
agriculture. According to a 2008 survey by the National Statistics Office of Malawi, 84%
of all workers reported their primary source of employment was in ‘agriculture, fishing
or forestry’. Furthermore, the magnitude of FISP was large. According to Dorward and
Chirwa (2011), during the 2008/2009 growing season, expenditures on the program were
approximately 16% of the national budget and 74% of the Ministry of Agriculture and
Food Security’s budget. These two factors lead us to believe the main effect of ethnic
alignment on deforestation is through the agricultural subsidies.
The coefficients from estimating the above IV model are presented in Table 3.6. We
use the natural log of deforestation and the natural log fertilizer in order to produce more
easily interpretable elasticities. Columns (1) through (3) in Panel A are the results from
an OLS regression of fertilizer and deforestation - estimating equation (3.7) replacing
observed predicted fertilizer with observed fertilizer. Observed fertilizer is endogeneous,
these estimates will be biased though the direction of the bias is theoretically ambiguous.
The OLS results indicate a negative relationship between fertilizer and deforestation.
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Table 3.6: District-level estimates of the elasticity of fertilizer and deforestation
Panel A (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log Fertilizer -0.0304 -0.221** -0.360** -0.414 -1.049 9.958
(0.0554) (0.0994) (0.147) (0.355) (0.723) (28.18)
Year FEs NO YES YES NO YES YES
Controls NO NO YES NO NO YES
Observations 264 264 264 264 264 264
Instrument None None None Majority Majority Majority
IV F-Statistic NA NA NA 7.878 4.606 0.128
R-squared 0.001 0.125 0.499
Panel B (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Log Fertilizer -0.583** -1.202** -0.223 -0.688* -1.093** 22.61
(0.280) (0.489) (1.423) (0.356) (0.466) (291.6)
Year FEs NO YES YES NO YES YES
Controls NO NO YES NO NO YES
Observations 264 264 264 264 264 264
Instrument Plurality Plurality Plurality Share Share Share
IV F-Statistic 15.18 11.52 0.980 10.24 11.76 0.00583
R-squared
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Columns (4) through (6) use the ethnic majority aligned with the president as the
instrument, but because we are using district-level data we have too few districts with a
strict majority of Yao or Lomwe to provide sufficient power in the first stage regression - as
evident by the low F-statistics. Panel B uses the plurality and share alignment variables,
which provide more first-stage predictive power. The results in Panel B indicate that
fertilizer allocations have a significant impact on deforestation even when aggregated to
the district level. The preferred estimates are in columns (7) and (10) and suggest an
elasticity of deforestation with respect to fertilizer between −.59 and −.69. Inclusion of
district-level controls in the IV specifications dramatically reduces first-stage explanatory
power as both ethnic composition and other controls are time invariant and the district-
level aggregation leaves us with relatively few observations.
3.4 Final Remarks
In this paper, we provide evidence that ethnic alignment with the president played an
important role in the allocation of fertilizer subsidies in Malawi. We further demonstrate
that ethnic alignment with the president leads to a significant decrease in deforestation.
At the district level, the elasticity between fertilizer subsidies and deforestation is negative
and instrumental variable estimates utilizing ethnic favoritism in fertilizer allocation are
larger in magnitude than the OLS estimates in most specifications.
These large and statistically significant effects show the importance of measuring the
impacts of environmental spillovers of development programs to conduct an efficient cost
benefit analysis. Additionally, policymakers should focus on implementing poverty alle-
viation programs, such as fertilizer subsidies, that have beneficial environmental impacts
because they may be able to provide a ‘win-win’ scenario.
Many questions remain for future work. Given the spillover effect of avoided defor-
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estation from fertilizer subsidies, how should these subsidies be targeted? The optimal
allocation with the joint objective of poverty alleviation and environmental benefits may
differ from the optimal allocation with the single objective of poverty alleviation. While
we leverage ethnic favoritism in the allocation of fertilizer subsidies to examine their re-
lationship to deforestation, it is likely the case that ethnic favoritism may have welfare
consequences by diverting fertilizer away from households or districts where it could have
a larger impact on both poverty and deforestation. What are the welfare consequences
of this pattern of resource allocation? We look forward to pursuing these questions in
future work.
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Appendix A
Reelection Incentives, Blacklisting
and Deforestation in Brazil
A.0.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof by contradiction. Let h∗ be the vector of deforestation allocations that maxi-
mizes the utility of a corrupt politician conditional on
∑N
i=1 hi = H for a given level of
H and given a set of truthful bids from landowners, {s∗i }i∈N . This implies
h∗ = ARGMAXh{
N∑
i=1
s∗i (hi)} (A.1)
S.T.
N∑
i=1
hi = H.
Now assume some other allocation vector, h˜ 6= h∗ yields a higher payoff for the
benevolent mayor than does h∗ and also accords with the constraint of
∑N
i=1 hi = H.
This implies
N∑
i=1
ui(h˜i) +
N∑
i=1
s∗i (h˜i) >
N∑
i=1
ui(h
∗
i ) +
N∑
i=1
s∗i (h
∗
i ). (A.2)
Substituting equation (1.2) for ui(hi) and canceling the positive sum of s
∗
i (hi) with the
negative sum of s∗i (hi) from (1.2), yields the following inequality.
N∑
i=1
Pαiq(h˜i) >
N∑
i=1
Pαiq(h
∗
i ) (A.3)
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Subtracting
∑N
i=1 Pαiq(0) from both sides yields
N∑
i=1
Pαiq(h˜i)−
N∑
i=1
Pαiq(0) >
N∑
i=1
Pαiq(h
∗
i )−
N∑
i=1
Pαiq(0). (A.4)
Which is equivalent to
N∑
i=1
(
Pαiq(h˜i)− αiPq(0)
)
>
N∑
i=1
(
Pαiq(h
∗
i )− Pαiq(0)
)
.
N∑
i=1
s∗i (h˜i) >
N∑
i=1
s∗i (h
∗
i ) (A.5)
Which contradicts equation (A.1). Therefore, any allocation vector such that
∑N
i=1 hi =
H that maximizes the utility of the corrupt politician will also maximize the utility of
the benevolent politician.
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